
On the occasion of the 31st anniversary of the martyrs of Vienna - 1989



The life and death of Dr. Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou (1930-1989)

Kurdistan Democratic Party - Iran Abroad Committee Media Centre 13 July 2020



This booklet has been prepared by Kurdistan Democratic Party (Abroad Committee Media Centre) to commemorate the 31st anniversary of the assassination of Dr. A.R. Ghassemlou, the Secretary General of Kurdistan Democratic Party-Iran, who was assassinated by the Iranian regime in Vienna on 13th of July 1989 while negotiating with the Iranian "terrorist-diplomats" to reach a peace agreement regarding the Kurdish Issue in Iran.

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
MAN of PEACE and DIALOGUE

The life and death of Dr. Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou (1930-1989)

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MAN of PEACE and DIALOGUE

The Attainment of national Kurdish rights within a federal democratic Iran.

Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou, the Secretary-General of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP-Iran), was born on 22 December 1930 in Ourmiah, Kurdistan.

He went to university in Paris and later Czechoslovakia, had a Doctorate in economics and was an associate professor, having taught in Prague and Paris.

n 1941, the Allies invaded Iran in a 'bridge of victory" operation that inevitably brought about the downfall of Reza Shah because of his relations with the Axis powers. A major political change was to take shape in the country. In Iranian Kurdistan the national movement came back to life and the KDP founded on 16 August.

1945, attracted young people in its masses. One of them was Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou - not yet 15 years old. On 22 January 1946 the Kurdish Republic of Mahabad came into existence by proclamation, but in December of the same year the imperial army with the help of the Western forces entered the city, and the killing and arrests that followed were as cruel as they were indiscriminate. The Republic had fallen; its President, Qazi Mohammad, and his close followers were taken prisoner, and then put to death on 30 March 1947.

Little by little the Kurdish people re-gathered their strength. The Republic of Mahabad may have been short-lived but in the collective memory it did not die. Running unlimited risks, the Kurdish leaders set about the vast task of protecting, educating and organizing the population. Back from Europe in 1952, Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou devoted his energies to these clandestine activities for several years. In the next decade, he split his time between Europe and Kurdistan working in double harness: his university career and his repeated missions to Kurdistan.

In 1959, the regional context appeared to be more hopeful; in neighbouring Iraq, the monarchy had been overthrown, and Molla Mostafa Barzani (leader of the Democratic Party of Iraqi Kurdistan) had returned to his country after eleven years of exile in former USSR. The government in Baghdad accepted the principle of autonomy for the Kurdish population of Iraq.

On the other side of the frontier, the KDP steeled itself to renew the struggle. In 1968-69, the armed conflict was rife in Iranian Kurdistan and the period ended in a bath of blood with the massacre of the Kurdish leaders - and yet, even then, Kurdish resistance managed to raise its head again. The vice-like grip in which the Shah's armies were trying to hold it had to be broken. At the third Congress of the KDP (1973), Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou was elected Secretary-general and at those that followed he was invariably returned to office.

During the years that followed, the prestige of the Pahlavi monarchy continued to wane. The White Revolution was questioned by experts in international affairs; the greedy demands and extravagant behaviour of the court were criticized in the press, and the SAVAK was active throughout the country with no social class being spared its baneful attentions. Clearly, the regime was doomed. If that happened, what should be the position of KDP? In view of the complex nature of the problems in the region that position had to be clear-cut. The Party had to reply unambiguously to a number of questions about its identity, its allegiances, its aspirations and its options. Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou and his aides drew up as coherent and realistic a programme as they could which may be summarized, in essence, as follows:

- We are Kurds, we belong to a people that the vicissitudes of history have scattered over five states. A bond of brotherhood binds us, and will continue to bind us, to all other Kurds, wherever they live.
- We are the descendants of one of the oldest Indo-European civilizations. Our identity is defined by the fact that we have our own language and our own culture.
- We are the citizens of a country called Iran on the same basis of the other people's living on the Iranian territory: the Baluch's, Persians, Azeris, Arabs, Turkmens and so on.
- We are ardent defenders of the Declaration of Human Rights and the right of peoples as defined by the United Nations.
- We are for the freedom of worship and we respect all religions practiced by our co-citizens. Faith is an inviolable right. However, being resolutely modern in our outlook, we feel that a separation between the religious institutions and the state is desirable. A lay state is not, on that account, opposed to the faith or to those that serve it.
- For the living conditions of all to be improved, and customs from long ages past condemning women to a state of inferiority to be ended.
- To accelerate development in our country, it is necessary to establish a system providing free education of uniform quality throughout the country. A special effort should be made in the peripheral areas (Kurdistan, for example) that are clearly a long way behind.
- No attempt to leave poverty behind will succeed without the active participation of the people themselves. To feel concerned so we believe -they have to feel free. Freedom of movement for goods and persons, freedom of association and freedom to form political parties or unions and to belong to such organizations are the indispensable preconditions for economic and cultural development.
- For there to be trust between the population and the central authority, large-scale decentralization is necessary.
- In Kurdistan's case, that decentralization has to comprise a charter of autonomy for the region whose boundaries would need to be precisely defined. Within this Kurdish space, the administrative languages should be Kurdish and Farsi, which would both be official languages of the regional and local authorities. Primary education should be in Kurdish whereas the two official languages

should be routine practice in secondary school. Lastly, after so many years of violence, the Kurdish people could not accept a police force that was not manned by Kurds. It is only on these conditions that there would be any chance of lasting peace in Iranian Kurdistan.

- Lastly, the "kurdification" of the administrative and 'production structures would demand major investment in the training of senior officials and staff and also - it goes without saying - a multidisciplinary university on Kurdish land.

In other words, what the leaders of the KDP demand is genuine and effective autonomy. Unfortunately, as everyone knows, dictatorships hide behind pyramid-shape structures excluding all horizontal communication. Feeling themselves perpetually threatened (as indeed they are), they seek the support of foreign powers, which, in the end, become their masters. Dictators are not free and they abuse the freedom of others. So the autonomy of Iranian Kurdistan would be utopian unless Iran made the change to democracy. Without democracy in Iran there could be no guarantee for autonomy in Kurdistan.

Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou saw that these two concepts were inseparable and so they became the watchword of the KDP: Democracy for Iran, autonomy for Kurdistan.

This policy statement in which chauvinism and sectarianism had no part won the KDP the firm friendship of Third World countries and modern democracies alike.

During his many trips abroad, Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou was always sure of a warm welcome. Many humanitarian organizations offered him help, eminent figures on the world stage in political and university life thought highly of him and human rights and religions militants encouraged him throughout his life. It was thanks to him that the Iranian Kurds were able to emerge from their isolation and make their voice heard in the international fora. Some of these sympathizers were surprised that the Iranian Kurds had "such modest" demands after such a bitter struggle. "It is really autonomy you want - nothing more?" was a not uncommon reaction.

No secret clause was ever planned or hidden in this blueprint for autonomy because it was the fruit of long and profound thought about the world political context following World War II. The Kurdish leaders took the view that major changes to frontiers were ruled out and that the general trend was towards the formation of large groupings rather that the fragmentation of existing units. In any case, once peace was restored, it would surely be natural for countries with common borders to seek to develop trade and cultural exchange. Therefore, in the long term, the existence of big Kurdish communities in various parts of the Middle East could be a positive factor in inter-regional relations. Everyone would stand to gain. It is well known that the big exporting countries pay considerable attention to the ethnic minorities, which often act as bridgeheads or relay stations in campaigns to win a foothold in new markets.

In short, the Kurdish thinkers concluded that only the shortsighted could see ethnic, linguistic or religious diversity as an obstacle to development. In the future the big middle-eastern house would derive its energy from the many different elements of which it was built. This pattern was

particularly true of Iran itself with its 45 million inhabitants of which only 40 % were of Persian origin. (Today Iran has over sixty million inhabitants). At that time, towards 1975, this type of thinking sounded at least advanced, not to say fanciful. The Kurds were still under the heel of the Shah, but nothing is eternal, dictators included.

One day in February 1979 Mohammed Reza Pahlavi finally gave up the throne. At that time the KDP had a solid base and a real impact in Iranian Kurdistan. However, to run the territory properly and control its administration the police had to be removed and the army thrown out down to the very last man. This was the task of the "peshmergas" or partisans, who attacked army barracks and seized large stocks of arms and ammunition. Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou was then able to claim that, in a large part of Kurdistan, the Kurds were their own masters.

It was reasonable to hope that the Iranian revolution would have brought men to power able to

realize that the interests of the central authority and those of the Kurds were compatible. Elections were planned and a new constitution was being written for the country.

Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou was elected to the Assembly of experts and made ready to carry to the capital the message of the Kurds - a simple message: there is room for all in this country where everything needs doing or re-doing. Imam Khomeini, unfortunately, saw things differently, he labeled the newly elected

representative of the Kurds an "enemy of God" and declared a "holy war" on Kurdistan. This was in 1979. Sudden though it was, this call to arms was, in retrospect, not surprising. How, after all, could this grim gerontocrat with the cruelty of another age be prepared to give his attention to the history and wants of the Kurds? How could Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou be expected to stay silent at the hostage-taking, occupation of foreign embassies and other terrorist activities launched in 1979 by an Imam who had recently returned from Neauphle-le-Ch \$\psi\$ teau to sow the seeds of hate and insanity.


The Gulf War broke out the following September. Perhaps these unsubdued Kurds would be forgotten during this conflict between Iran and Iraq (1980-88). On the contrary, in fact, it cost them dearly, for their villages lay on either side of the frontier where the fighting was at its fiercest. They were accused, too, of being anti-patriotic: their settlements were destroyed and the people living there reduced to a wandering existence. The ultimate purpose of these crimes against humanity was obvious: to use the war as an excuse for exterminating a people whose authenticity was denied as strongly as it was proclaimed by the Kurds.

Iran came out of the war with Iraq exhausted and the Imam at death's door. The facts had to be faced and Tehran had to find a compromise in Kurdistan. For his part, Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou had been saying for years that the fighting had been imposed on him, that neither side would ever lose or win and that, sooner or later, the Kurdish problem would have to be solved across the negotiating table. After flying a few kites, Tehran issued a concrete proposal for a meeting in Vienna on 28 December 1988 and the KDP accepted. The talks lasted two days, 28 and 30 December and the results must have been promising because it was agreed to hold another meeting the following January. On 20 January, at the end of the first round of negotiations, the representatives of Tehran were fully acquainted with the Kurdish demands. The principle of autonomy seemed to have been agreed. The details of how it was to be put into effect had yet to be defined.

Six months later, Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou returned to Europe to attend a congress of the Socialist International. Tehran tried to contact him again in order, he was told, to pursue the negotiations that had begun the previous winter. The KDP accepted the offer sent to it. The meeting took place on 12 July 1989 in Vienna. The Tehran delegation was as before, namely Mohammed Jafar Sahraroudi and Hadji Moustafawi, except that this time there was also a third member: Amir Mansur Bozorgian whose function was that of bodyguard. The Kurds also had a three-man delegation: Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou, his aide Abdullah Ghaderi-Azar (member of the KDP Central Committee) and Fadhil Rassoul, an Iraqi university professor who had acted as a mediator.

The next day, 13 July 1989, in the very room where the negotiation took place Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou was killed by three bullets fired at very close range. His assistant Abdullah Ghaderi-Azar was hit by eleven bullets and Fadhil Rassoul by five. Hadji Moustafawi succeeded in escaping. Mohammad Jafar Sahraroudi received minor injuries and was taken to hospital, questioned and allowed to go. Amir Mansur Bozorgian was released after 24 hours in police custody and took refuge in the Iranian Embassy.

Indignation was at its height. How, in this age, in the heart of Europe, could it happen for the representatives of a member country of the United Nations to open fire at point blank range on the representatives of a country with whom it was at war and had entered into peace negotiations? On 19 July two representatives of the political bureau of KDP came to Paris to attend the funeral.



At a press conference they announced, among other things, that the higher authorities of the KDP had appointed Sadegh Sharafkandi to perform the duties of Secretary-general. Sadegh Sharafkandi (who was also assassinated on 17 September 1992 by the Iranian terrorists) was in his fifties and had a doctorate in industrial chemistry from Paris University. He was Deputy Secretary-general of the Party up to the death of Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou.

The two murdered men of the KDP were buried on 20 July in Paris in the presence of a throng of some two thousand people from all parts: Kurds and Armenians, Azeris and Turks, Persians and Europeans, poets and doctors, ministers and workpeople, representatives of humanitarian organizations and members of parliament. Leading the funeral procession, the peshmergas in their Kurdish resistance fighters' uniform advanced with difficulty in the torrid heat of the Parisian summer. They were all there, all that had been able to travel on their crutches and in their wheelchairs, having come from the various capitals of Europe where they were recovering, as best they could, from the wounds received in the conflict. Tehran denied all connection with this triple murder and told Austria to look for clues in other directions than Iran. But the findings of the ballistics experts were conclusive.

In late November 1989 the Austrian courts issued a warrant for the arrest of the three Iranian representatives and the Austrian Government expressly accused the Iranian Government as having instigated the attack on Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou and the two other Kurds.

Thus died this man who was no warmonger but a man of letters, master of several languages and persuasive speaker. Overflowing with enthusiasm and energy, he was an intellectual of his time, this end of the twentieth century when the triumph of democracy seems really within reach.

The News coverage of the assassination of Dr. Ghassemlou by the international media at the time



Rätsel um Schwerverletzten

Der am Donnerstagabend zusammen mit zwei weiteren Kurden ermordete Generalsekretär der kurdischen Demokratischen Partei, Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou, hat wahrscheinlich mit einem Vertreter des Iran über eine Kompromißlösung zwischen Kurden und der Teheraner Führung verhandelt, als die Bluttat verübt wurde. Über die Identität des schwerverletzten Gesprächspartners der Kurden herrscht Unklarheit.

Nach letzten Informationen der "Wiener Zeitung" handelt es sich um den für Kurdenfragen zuständigen Spitzenoffizier der iranischen Revolutionsgarde (Pasdaran), Mohammed Rahimi.

Die österreichische Staatspolizei hält dagegen den Namen des Verletzten geheim,
der im übrigen noch nicht
vernehmungsfähig ist. Nach
Angaben der iranischen Botschaft in Wien wiederum soll
es sich bei dem Verletzten
um den iranischen Diplomaten Djafari Saharoodi handeln.

In einer Stellungnahme der iranischen Botschaft hatte es am Freitagabend geheißen, Ghassemlou habe in Wien mit iranischen Abgesandten über eine "friedliche Lösung" anstehender Probleme sowie über eine allfällige "Immunität für reuige Mitglieder der Kurdischen Demokratischen Partei" verhandelt. Die Gespräche darüber seien seit einiger Zeit geführt worden und einem positiven Abschulß nahe gewesen.

Ghassemiou hatte vor wenigen Wochen dem österreichischen Kurdenexperten und "Wiener Zeitung"-Mitarbeiter Dr. Ferdinand Hen-nerbichler ein Interview ge-geben und darin erstmals betont, daß er bereit wäre, mit Vertretern der Revolutionsführung in Teheran nach dem Tod von Ayatollah Kho-meini einen Dialog über ei-nen Kurdenkompromiß im Iran zu beginnen. Henner-bran zu beginnen auf dem bichler - der u. a. als damaliger österreichischer Presseattaché in Athen 1984 die Geheimverhandlungen über die Freilassung westeuropäischer Geiseln aus kurdi-scher Gefangenschaftgeführt hatte - ersuchte daraufhin seinen in Wien im Exil lebenden Freund, Dr. Fadil Rasoul, zu vermitteln und Kontakte zwischen Ghassemiou und Teheran zustande zu bringen.

Diese Verbindung ist vermutlich in Wien angebahnt
worden. Fadil Rasoul vermittelte Ghassemlou als Gesprächspartner offensichtlich den höchsten Offizier
der Pasdaran, zuständig für
Kurdenfragen, Mohammed
Rahimi. Dieser überlebte
das Attentat schwerverletzt,
ist aber nach vorliegenden
Informationen bisher noch
nicht in der Lage, zu sprechen und der Polizei Angaben über die mutmaßlichen
Attentäter zu machen.

Die mutmaßlichen Täter werden in Teheran vor allem unter drei Gruppen vermutet:

Erstens unter Gegnern eines angestrebten Kurdenkompromisses im Iran generell,

rweitens unter Rivalen Ghassemlous in der eigenen Partei, die sich im Vorjahr von seiner Führung abgespaltet haben und seither ein Bündnis mit den iranischen Volksmudschaheddin im Exil in Bagdad eingegangen sind, und

drittens in Kreisen der Volksmudschaheddin selbst.

Auch die Iraker werden als Drahtzieher oder Hintermänner des Anschlages verdächtigt.

Einer der bedeutendsten Führer der irakischen KurFührer der irakischen Kurden, Jalal Talahani, hat an
Innenminister Franz Löschnak appelliert, alle möglichen Spuren zu untersuchen
und die Bluttat restlos aufzuklären. Radio Teheran erklärte am Freitag in einer ersten Analyse, Ghassemlou
sei dabei gewesen, die Seiten

zu wechseln und but de Iran eine Friedenslösige zustreben.

Im Nahen Osten wird in angenommen, daß mit de Tode Ghassemlous die he mühungen um eine Kark lösung im Iran schwissigeworden sein durch Scharf verurteilt hat Pren abend ein Sprecher von Masoud Barzani, dem Vonzenden der Demokratusch Partei Kurdistans Irat bijungsten Kurdenmorde Wien. Auf Massoud Barnewar im Jahr 1979 in Wiene Attentat verüht worden

Ein Sprecher der Parte e klärte in Paris, der ermen te Ghassemlou und se Stellvertreter Abdullah Ge deri-Azar würden komme de Woche in Paris auf der Pere-Lachaise-Friedhof be gesetzt. Der Mord sei est Katastrophe für die Kurön man lasse sich aber daduri nicht einschüchtern.

Der Sicherheitssprecher ist OVP, Abg. Wendelin Ettmayer, forderte im Zusammehang mit dem Attentat si die Kurdenpolitiker Samstag im Pressedam seiner Partei eine stärken Überwachung ausländischt Geheimdienste in Östereich.

Der blutige Überfall in de Bahngasse 5/12 in Wes Landstraße am Donnerste abend ist mit den zwei inden Nacht auf Freitag in de Linken Wienzeile in Wes Mariahilf sichergestellten Pstolen verübt worden. De ebenfalls gefundene MPwede bei dem Anschlag auf ver Kurden, bei dem drei vollnen getötet wurden, nicht verwendet.

Dies erklärte Hofrat Werne Liebhart, der Leiter & Staatspolizei, Samstag De Fahndung nach den Taum verlief vorerst ohne Erge nis.







Die Presse

Unabhängige Tageszeitung für Österreich

Freitag, 14. Juli 1989

Terroranschlag in Wien Drei Kurden erschossen

Einem Terroranschlag fielen in einem Wohnhaus beim reich des Tatortes abgestelbe Wiener Stadtpark drei Iraner, darunter eine Frau, Angehörige der kurdischen Volksgruppe, zum Opfer, ein vierter wurde durch Schüsse schwer verletzt. Die durch gezielte Schüsse in den Kopf und den Oberkörper Getöteten wurden am gestrigen Donnerstagabend entdeckt. Die Staatspolizei ist dabei, die Identität der Ermordeten zu klären. Von dem Täter oder den Tätern fehlte gestern abend jede Spur.

WIEN (red.). Donnerstag gegen 19
Uhr wurden die Gäste des Cafés
"Tritsch-Tratsch" Ecke Ungargasse-Linke Bahngasse in WienLandstraße durch eine ungewöhnliche Aktion aufgeschreckt. Plötzlich standen zwei Manner in der
Tür. Ein blutverschmierter, etwa
dreißigjähriger Ausländer wurde
von einem etwa vierzigjährigen
Mann herangeschleppt. Das Opfer
hatte erhebliche Verletzungen am
Oberkörper.

Kaum hatte der vermeintliche Helfer den Schwerverletzten vor der Tür des Lokals abgelegt, lief er über die Ungarbrücke zu der nahegelegenen Tankstelle neben dem Hauptmünzamt, kam aber wenig spater zurück. Jetzt hantierte er an der Kleidung des Verletzten herum und zog daraus, wie beobachtet wurde, ein weißes Kuvert, das etwa 20 Zentimeter breit und einen Zentimeter dick gewesen sein soll. Ob sich darin Geld oder aber wichtige Dokumente befanden, ist noch unklar.

Der "Helfer" hat eine. Glatze und einen Oberlippenbart und war sichtlich überaus nervös. Er selbst führte die Polizei schließlich zum Tatort in der Linken Bahngasse 5, wo die Kriminalisten in einer Wohnung im 3. Stock auf die drei Toten stießen.

Alle drei waren, soweit dien

nung eingezogen. Auch Nachbarn am Werk gewesen sind. Wahrend wußten gestern zu berichten, daß die Leichen zweier der "Hingessich bei den neuen Mietern um richteten", darunter eine Frau.

Zwei Männer aus dem Bekanntenkreis der Getöteten gaben sich
kurz nach der Entdeckung der
Bluttat gestern am Tatort
"Presse"-Reportern gegenüber
freimutig als Kurden aus, baten
aber: "Bitte, nicht photographieren, drei Mitglieder der Organisation sind schon tot!"

Eine Mieterin des Hauses, in dem sich das Café "Tritsch-Tratsch" befindet, erklärte, sie habe am Mittwoch, also am Tag vor der Entdeckung des Verbrechens, zwischen 20 und 21 Uhr drei laute Schreie gehört, deren Herkunft sie aber nicht genau habe lokalisteren können. Theoretisch wäre es also möglich, daß die Tat bereits am Vortag verübt wurde.

Ein wichtiger Zeuge ist ein Arzt. der am Donnerstagabend zufällig bei dem Café vorbeikam und der den Verletzten, der auch ein blutder durchtränktes Tuch um den Hals trug, erstversorgte und ihm einen Druckverband anlegete. Der Mediziner wurde bei Redaktionsschluß noch von der Polizei einvernommen.

Ebenso einverno

Die Linke Bahngasse was unmittelbar nach Bekanntweindes Terroranschlags - die Stationer des Terroranschlags - die Stationer des Terroranschlags - die Stationer des Terroranschlags - die Spurenschlag eine Begannen, nachde Kriminalisten die Spurenschlasten der Mordwohnung abseichlossen hatten, alle im Nachder reich des Tatortes abgestelber des Tatortes abgestelber des Tatortes abgestelber den sollte damit ein eventuelle zusätzlicher Bombenanschlag einen sollte damit ein eventuelle zusätzlicher Bombenanschlag einen sich weitere Hinweis auf den oder die Jeter

Der Mordanschlag war offensichtlich von langer Hand geplant Sicher ist, daß geübte Schutzen am Werk gewesen sind. Wahrend die Leichen zweier der "Hingerichteten", darunter eine Fraujeweils nur einen genau gezielten Kopfschuß aufwiesen, wurde das dritte Opfer nicht nur durch Kopfschuß, sondern auch durch mehrere Treffer in den Oberkorper getötet. Bei der oder den Tatwaffen dürfte es sich um solche von mittlerem Kaliber, also etwa 7,65 mm, gehandelt haben

Dem Blutbad ging offenbar auch ein Kampf voraus Darauf deuten ein umgestürzter Tisch, eine gekippte Sitzbank und zerbrechene Gläser hin. Am Tatort wurden mehrere Zettel mit Notizen in arabischer Schrift sichergestellt.

Hatte es in ersten Meldungen geheißen, die Ermordeten seien Diplomaten, so stellte sich dies im weiteren Verlauf des Abends als unhaltbar heraus. Vielmehr durten die Toten mit größter Wahrscheinlichkeit einer Organisation iranischer Kurden angehört haben.

Täter und Opfer scheinen einander gekannt zu haben. An der Tür zur Tatwohnung wurden keine Spuren von Gewaltanwendung gefunden, was darauf schließen läßt, daß die Opfer sich entweder

AL-BAYAT TUESDAY JULY 25, 1989 ISSUE NO 9727

كيف اغتيل الزعيم الكردي في فيينا؟ النمسا سلمت الى ايران التهمين باغتيال قاسملو

🗆 فيينا – دالحياة:«

■ علمت «الحياة» من مصادر سياسية مطلعة أن السلطات النمسوية سلمت إلى طهران المتهمين الإيرانيين بقسقل الزعيم الكردي عبدالرحمن قاسملو ورئيس تحرير مجلة «منبر الحوار» الصحافي العراقي فاضل رسول بحجة أنها لا ترد توتراً في علاقاتها مع أيران.

وروت المصادر لـ «الصياة» كيف اغتنال الزعميم الكردي، قسالت: «أن اتصالات سيرية جيرت في الاسابيع الاخبرة بن قاسملو وبعض الجهات الإمرانية الرسمية، واتفق على عودة الرَّعْسِمِ الكردي الى ايران واجسراء تسوية سياسية للمشكلة الكردية في ايران. وحددت جلسة في بيت سيدة نمسوية لوضع الصيغة النهائسة للاتفاق في حضور الصحافي فاضل رسول كشاهد محايد على التسوية. وفي اللحظة المسددة للقساء الذي سره قاسملو ورسول وثلاثة ابرانيين بينهم مستؤول امنى يدعى رحيمى شهر الايرانيون مسدسات واطلقوا النارعلى فأسطو ورسول واصبيب رحيمي عن طريق الخطأ فتركه رفيقاه ظناً منهما انه قتل وفرًا، الأان السلطات النمسيومة طاردتهما واعتقلتهما ثم عادت وسلمتهما الى طهران بينما نقل رحسيمي الى المستشفى ويعدها الى صقر سفارة

وشيع رسول يوم الاحد في فيينا في حضور عدد من اصدقائه من السياسيين والكتاب والصحافيين وسط استنكار الجميع، خصوصاً أن البحث والتاليف والنشر. وقد اعتبرت مصادر مراقية أنه كان ضحية ابتزاز السياسي منذ أكثر من عشر سنين، وترغ للنشر والتاليف واسس مجلة وكرية شهرية تصدر من بيروت وفيينا ماتمه الرئيس الجزائري السابق احمد من بيروت وفيينا ماتمه الرئيس الجزائري السابق احمد بن بيللا الذي القي كلمة تابين

وفي الافتتاحية التي ستصدر في العدد الحديد من منسر الحوار، كتب بن بيللا: «أن أسرة الحوار في حرن لأن رئيس تحريرها اغتيل (...) وكذلك قبراء الحبوار وكل من عبرف فيناضل رستول، وأضاف أن رستول أحمل في شخصيته عنوان مجلته وكان رجل صوارة وبعدما الساد بخصاله الشخصية لاحظ ان بد الغدر امتدت البه في يوم الغفران... في عبيد الأضمى المبارك بينما كان يشارك في صنع اتفاق يحمل أفاق السلام لاخوته الاكراد. أن اغتسال فأضل بلخص صاساتنا (...) البسرابرة أصبروا على اغتيال الاشخاص الكبار الذين أمنوا بالفكر، حتى في عواصم بعيدة،

في بغداد (رويتسر) أفادت وكالة الإنساء العراقية أن جتمان محمود رسول فاضل وصل الى بغداد لدفنه.

Die kurdische Frage bleibt aktuell

Wahlen in der Region der Minderheit im Irak haben die Repression nicht beendet

Von Heiko Flottau

Kairo, 12. September - Die irakische Regierung meldet einen Erfolg: Ein histori-scher Schritt sei getan, in der "autonomen Region" Kurdistan hätten einheimische Kurden ihr regionales Parlament gewählt, 30 von 50 Sitzen seien von der in Bagdad regierenden Baath-Partei gewonnen worden. Ein Schritt zur Befriedung einer unruhigen Gegend sei getan, könnte man meinen

Die Wirklichkeit indessen sieht anders aus. Im Golfkrieg haben irakische Kurden den Iran unterstützt - um sich für viele Demütigungen zu rächen, die sie durch das Regime Saddam Husseins erlitten hatten, vor allem aber in der falschen Hoffnung, ein siegreicher Iran werde ihnen, den Kurden, endlich wahre Autonomie bringen. Kaum war indessen am 20. August 1988 der Waffenstillstand im Golfkrieg in Kraft, startete Saddam Hussein eine neue Kampagne; diesmal ging es gegen die Kurden im nordöstlichen Teil des Irak. Viele wurden getötet, viele wurden verschleppt, Häuser und Dörfer wurden zerstört, erntereife Felder abgebrannt.

Schon während des Krieges hatte das-Regime Saddam Husseins damit begonnen Kurden aus ihrer Heimat zu verschleppen, bis in die unwirtlichen, unerträglich heißen Wüstengebiete an der kuwaitischen und saudischen Grenze. Ebenfalls hatte der Irak – damals aus militärischen Gründen wohl zu rechtfertigen - begonnen, im irakischen Teil Kurdistans zur iranischen Grenze hin eine Art Sicherheitszone einzurichten. Noch während des Krieges waren mehr als 4000 Kurden bei einem irakischen Giftgasangriff in Halabja getotet worden. Be-hauptungen, daß auch in der Kampagne nauptung nsch dem Waffenstillstand Giftgas gegen die Kurden angewendet worden sei, konnten die Iraker nicht recht widerlegen.

im ersten Jahr des Walfenstillstandes im ersten unter häufigen Protesten von Menschenrechtsvereinigungen, aber un-Menschendem Stillschweigen der Regierungen - die Zwangsumsiedlungen aus Irukisch-Kurdistan weiter. Siedlungen wurden systematisch vernichtet, ein Teil der Emwohner mußte in künstliche, von Armee and Basth-Miliz bewachte Beton-Armee und in der Nahe der gut zu übernanden kurdischen Städte Suleimanya und Erbil umziehen. Noch schlimmer traf es jene, die in die heißen Regionen des irakischen Südens weit entfernt von ihren angestammten Wohnsitzen deportiert wurden. Insgesamt 250 000 der etwa vier Millionen irakischen Kurden werden derzeit allein innerhalb des Nordirak umgesiedelt - in 22 streng bewachte Internierungszentren.

Das Regime Saddam Husseins will, so scheint es, das sogenannte "kurdische Problem" ein für allemal lösen, indem es, so muß man die Ereignisse wohl deuten, die kurdische Bevölkerung ihrer Identität beraubt, sie in den dünnbesiedelten Irak disloziert und die in Kurdistan Gebliebenen unter strenge militärische Bewachung

Neun bis zehn Millionen Kurden leben in der Türkei, wo sie keine autonomen Rechte haben und wo sie in der Gesellschaft nur aufsteigen können, wenn sie ihrer Nationalität entsagen. Vier bis fünf Millionen Kurden leben im Iran, etwa 600 000 in Syrien, 200 000 Kurden zählt die Sowjetunion. Das über fünf Staater streute Volk ging leer aus, als diese ten nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg tell aus der Erbmasse des auseinanders chenen Osmanischen Reiches entst. In den Friedensvertrag der Alliieru der Türkei von Sevres (1929) soil armenischer und ein kurdischer Stas genommen werden. Der Vertrag schi an Kemal Atatürk, der gegen Interv nen aus dem Ausland kämpfte, um türkischen Staat mit einem einheit türkischen Staatsvolk zu gründen In trag von Lausanne war 1923 dan nationalen Staaten der Armenie Kurden nicht mehr die Rede.

Manche Staaten des Nahen Osten koloniale Kunstgebilde. Ein kurd Staat hätte sich auf ein Volk mit reschlossenen Siedlungsraum, eine nen Sprache und einer eigenen gestützt. Der Staat existiert nicht, D bleibt die "kurdische Frage" aktuell der Unterdrückung in der Türkei un der Rep islonen Saddam Hussein

INTERNATIONAL HE

TRIBUNE

23./24.9.1989

25 Hurt in Baghdad Grenade Attack

CAIRO (Reuters) — Twenty-five persons were injured when three grenades exploded in the garden of an expatriate social club in the Iraquapital, Baghdad, on Wednesday, a British Embassy spokesman said

The grenades were thrown over a wall around the British Club on the east bank of the Tigris River and exploded among dozens of people watching a film in the garden, said the spokesman, contacted by telephone in the said the spokesman. phone from Cairo. No one was killed but a nine-year-old Polish boy was seriously hurt. Canadians, Irish. Yugoslavs and Britons were among the

25.9.1989

■ Iraq Attacks Kurd Bases

The Iraqi Army has launched a new offensive against Kurdish guernilas near the Iranian border, the first major assault in a year. The Associated Press reported from Nicosia, quoting a guerrilla spokes-

The spokesman of the outlawed Patriotic Union of Kurdistan said Saturday that an army division, supported by arullery and helicon-



URDEN

Die dem Tod ins Auge blicken

Geheime Friedensverhandlungen der Kurden mit dem iranischen Regime endeten in Wien im Kugelhagel.

m 19.20 Uhr ging die Tür auf, und zwei oder drei Männer betraten den sam. Wortlos eröffneten sie das Feuer", ah der einzige Überlebende, ein iranicher Diplomat, bei den Ermittlungen an. it Waffen, zwei Pistolen mit Schallampfern und eine Maschinenpistole, fanch sich später unter Autos und in Müllomainern am Wiener Naschmarkt.

Am Tatort, einer Wohnung in der Linken lingasse 5 im dritten Gemeindebezirk, en drei Tote zurück: der Generalsefar der Kurdischen Demokratischen flei (KDP), Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou, sein Stellvertreter Abduallah Ghaderi. sowie der irakische Kurde Fadil Raso-38. Ein vierter Mann rettete sich, geffen von einem Schuß in den Mund und Arm, auf die Straße, wo er auf einen eren Mann traf, der auf dem Weg zur mang in der Linken Bahngasse war sich - als Zeuge von der Polizei eintimen - als iranischer Kurde ausgab. n der transschen Botschaft wußte Moed Khiarischi, Leiter der Wiener Ex-W der iranischen Nachrichtenagentur bereits Bescheid: "Wir haben zu-



Kurdenführer Ghassemlou in den heimatlichen Bergen: Bereit zum Frieden mit den Mullahs

ort. Die iranische Botschaft in der Jaurès-

Ghassemlou war nach Wien gekommen, um für die kurdische Minderheit Friedensverhandlungen mit dem iranischen Mullahregime zu führen. Sen Monaten hatte er aus Paris Paden in Richtung Teheran gesponnen, wie der frühere irum sche Staatspräsident Abolhassan Bani Sadr in seinem Pariser Exil gegenüber profit bestätigt: ...Man stand kurz vor dem endgültigen Durchbruch. semiou war zur letzten Etappe nach Wien aufgebrochen." Die Schüsse in der Bahngasse setz-ten den Verhandlungen ein iihes Ende.

Fadil Rasoul mußte als Vermittler des Friedensgespräches ebenfalls sein Leben lassen. Ein iranischer Diplomat hatte ihn Ende Juni in einem Vier-Augen-Gespräch gebeten, Kontakte zur

KDP-Führung in Paris herzustellen. Rasoul willigte ein. Durch sein bewegtes Leben und seine publizistische Tätigkeit war er im ganzen Nahen Osten bekannt. Er wurde in Suleimaniye im irakischen Kurdengebiet geboren, nahm an der kommunistischen Bewegung teil, war dann bewaffneter Kämpfer der "Peschmetga" ("Die dem Tod ins Auge blicken") gegen die nahöstlichen Regimes und mußte schließlich in den Libanon flüchten.

Dort fand er im Bürgerkrieg Unterschlupf in Palästinenserlagern, studierte
später in Bagdad politische Wissenschaften. Seit Ende der siebziger Jahre lebte
Rasoul in Österreich und heiratete eine
Wienerin. Er stand der Patriotischen Union Kurdistans (PUK) im Irak nahe, wollte
aber keiner bestimmten Fraktion angehören. Seit vier Jahren gab er die Zeitschrift "Al Heiwar" ("Der Dialog") heraus, die in Beirut gedruckt und im ganzen
Nahen Osten verbreitet wird.

Fadil Rasoul war freier Mitarbeiter des von Bruno Kreisky gegründeten Österreichischen Instituts für Internationale Politik in Laxenburg. Er schrieb zwei ir Fachkreisen sehr geschätzte Bücher über den Nahen Östen. 1) Rasoul hielt Vorlesungen an der Universität Kairo und hatte einen Lehrauftrag für Politikwissenschafter an der Wiener Universität.

Rasouis Institutskollege in Laxenburg John Bunzi, beschreibt dessen Qualitäter als Vermittler. "Er war mein bestei Freund, der erste nahöstliche Intellektuelle, mit dem ich wirklich gut konnte. Viel leicht haben wir uns von Minderheit zu Minderheit verstanden, er als Kurde und ich als Jude – und wir beide als Linke. Rasoul hatte mit seiner Zeitschrift da Kunststück zuwege gebracht, von den zer

EFIGARO ALIRORE SEDITION OF PARIS

DE PARIS PRIX : 4,50 F

SAMEDI 15 - DIMANCHE 16 JUILLET 1989 (Nº 13 960)

AUTRICHE Un dirigeant kurde assassiné à Vienne

☐ Abdel Rhaman Ghassemlou, secrétaire général du parti démocratique du Kurdistan d'Iran (PDKI), opposé au régime de Téhéran et principale figure du mouvement automoniste kurde iranien, a été abattu jeudi, à Vienne, lors d'une fusillade. Deux autres militants kurdes ont été tués, une autre personne grièvement blessée.

Les trois Kurdes rencontraient un homme porteur d'un passeport diplomatique iranien lorsque les tueurs sont entrés dans l'appartement.

« Ces meurtres ressemblent à des exécutions », selon la police autrichienne qui a ajouté n'avoir aucune preuve que des services secrets étrangers aient été impliqués dans l'affaire. L'aile radicale du PDKI, qui a fait scission II y a un an pour s'associer aux moudjahidin du peuple iraniens, pourrait être à l'origine de l'attentat. « C'est un désastre », a déclaré un représentant du PDKI à Paris, où vivait Ghassemlou.



Fusillade à Vienne

Trois dirigeants kurdes d'Iran assassinés

Trois dirigeants du Parti démocratique du Kurdistan de l'Iran (PDKI) dont son secrétaire général, Abdel Rahman Ghassemlou (59 ans), ont été tués et un quatrième grièvement blessé jeudi soir lors d'un attentat perpétré dans un appartement à Vienne, a confirmé vendredi le Ministère autrichien de l'intérieur.

Selon un porte-parole de la police, les deux autres morts sont M. Abdullah Ghaderiazar, secrétaire général adjoint du PDK l et M. Fahdil Rasoul. M. Ghaderiazar, 37 ans, voyageait avec un passeport de réfugié établi en France et était venu de Paris pour rencontrer d'autres dirigeants kurdes à Vienne. M. Rasoul, âgé de 38 ans, est un Kurde irakien naturalisé Autrichien en 1985. L'identité de la quatrième victime, un Kurde titulaire d'un passeport diplomatique iranien, grièvement blessée, mais dont la vie ne serait pas en danger, n'est pas révélée par la police.

Cet homme a déclaré au cours d'un premier interrogatoire à l'hôpital que plusieurs membres de deux organisations kurdes se sont rencontrés dans l'appartement où a eu lieu la fusillade. L'attentat aurait été commis par deux où trois hommes, selon le témoin qui a été blesse au visage et notamment à la bouche.

Peu d'indices

Le mystère subsiste sur l'identité des auteurs de l'attentat et leurs motifs très probablement de nature politique, selon la police. Les enquêteurs ont retrouvé hier à proximité du lieu du crime deux pistolets munis de silencieux et différents vêtements ayant vraisemblablement appartenus aux auteurs de l'attentat. Ceux-ci ont pénétré dans l'appartement sans forcer la porte, ce qui donne à penser, selon la police, que les victimes les connaissaient ou que la porte n'était pas fermée. Les enquêteurs ont relevé des traces de lutte dans l'appartement.

La police a été alertée par un Kurde apparemment venu pour participer à la réunion et qui avait trouve le time grièvement blessee dans la Cet homme est connu de la poli sert de témoin.

Un dirigeant modéré

Abdel Rahman Ghassemlou, o vécu pendant des années en ex France, a été un des dirigeants de position iranienne. Selon des info tions recueillies dans les milieux des à Vienne, le secrétaire généra PDKI faisait partie des «modèrés sein de l'opposition iranienne.

On n'exelut pas dans ces mi que l'aile radicale du PDKI, qui scission il y a un an pour s'associe moudjahidin du peuple iranien, s à l'origine de l'attentat. L'attent jeudi soir est le deuxième per contre des dirigeants politiques ki à Vienne. En janvier 1979 le près du Parti kurde démocratique d'Massoud Barzani, avait survecu attentat dans lequel deux de ses gidu corps ont été tués.

Etranger

Attentat meurtrier à Vienne

L'opposition kurde iranienne décapitée

Trois dirigeants du Parti démocratique du Kurdistan de l'Iran (PDKI), dont son secrétaire général, Abdel Rahman Ghassemiou (59 ans), ont été tués et un quatrième grièvement blessé, jeudi soir, lors d'un attentat perpétré dans un appartement à Vienne.

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Des traces de lutte dans l'appartement

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La police a été alertée par un autre Kurde apparemment venu pour participer à la réunion et qui avait trouvé la victime grièvement blessée dans la rue. Cet homme est connu par la police et sert de témoin.

Abdel Rahman Ghassemlou, qui a vécu pendant des années en exil en France, a été un des dirigeants de l'opposition iranienne. Selon des informations recueillies le secrétaire généra de l' sait partie des « models» de l'opposition iranans

On n'exchit pas, des lieux, que l'aile radicas à qui a fait sclasion d'y ave s'associer aux mosses peuple iranien, sareit à l'ou l'attentat.

L'attentat de jeud sor a deuxième perpétré contra geante politiques kudes i in En janvier 1979, le philie Parti kurde démocratice o Messoud Barzani, evet are un attentat dans leque de ses gardes du corps avier tués. Les rapports em Kurdes de l'iran et de l'au tendus, notamment avie querre irano-irakierne.

VIENNE

Trois Kurdes assassinés

Le chef du Parti démocratique kurde et deux de ses militants en exil à Vienne ont été tués par balles dans leur appartement, sans doute pour des rivalités partisanes

Trois dirigeants du Parti démocratique du Kurdistan de l'Iran (PDKI), dont son secrétaire général, Abdel Rahman Ghassemiou (59 ans), ont été tués et un quatrième grièvement blessé jeudi soir lors d'un attentat perpétré dans un appartement

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our duesi

Eleftheroipia 17.07.89

to 17 loudiou 1989 EAEYBEPOTYTILA

ETON EBPO

Ειδήσεις - Ελλάδα

ΕΑΝΔΡΟΥΠΟΛΗ, 17.

PEII KOYPAOI TOUPKIκής υπηκοότητας σκο-τώθηκαν χτες στην πε-χή του Εβρου, όταν στην οσπάθειά τους να περά-υν στο ελληνικό έδαφος έσαν σε ναρκοπέδιο.

Στις 4.30 χτες το πρωί οι ούςδοι Χασάν Χαουρί Χα-μέν 28 χρόνων, Μασούμ αντίμ 33 και Αλίς Χαζίμα

Koupatia 3 Κούρδοι σε ναρκοπέδιο

34, πέρασαν το ποτάμι του Εδρευ κολυμπώντας. Στο ύνος
του χαριού Καστανιές μπή
καν στο ελληνικό έδασος.
Φαίνεται όμας ότι οι Κουρδοι
δεν γνώρυζαν καθόλου την
περιοχή και επειδή ήταν και
σχει έπεσαν στο ναρκοπέδιο. Ετοι κάποιος από τους
τρας πάτησε πρώτος τη νάρκη ακολούθησαν απαναντές
κερήξεις και σκοτώθηκαν και
μι άλλα δύο. Από τις εκρή
ξεις αναστατώθηκαν οι κάτοι
κοι του χωριού Καστανιές και
αμέσας ξεκίνησαν για την περιοχή που ακούστηκαν οι κ
βήξεις οιμάδες στρατιωτών
αναμεία τους υπαρχουν και
ναρκαλιωντές και οιμάδες σστυνομικών οι οποίοι βρήκαν
τα πτόματα.
Υπενθυμίζεται ότι πριν από
ένα χρόνο περίσσο, στην
προσπάθεια τους να περάσουν και αυτά παράνομα
στην Ελλάδα σκοτώθηκαν α
κρίβος με τον ίδιο τρόπο όλο
Ιρανοί.
Επίσης πριν από τρεις πε-

τους πρεν από τρεις πε-μηνες πύτηκε ένας Ι. μηνες πύτηκε ένας Ι. ς όταν προσταθούεν να μετα τον Εβρο για να μπα ανομα στο ελληνικό έδα-Ο Ιρανός παρασυρόηκε

Abroad Committee Media Centre

VIENNE

Parti kurde décapité

VIENNE (Reuter) — Le secrétaire général du Parti démocratique du Kurdistau (PDK) pro-trakten, Abdoul Rahman Kassemlou, et deux autres militants kurdes ont été assassinés, jeudi soir à Vienne, alors qu'ils rencontralent un quatrième homme porteur d'un passeport diplomatique iranien, a annoncé hier la police autrichienne.

Les tueurs ont fait irruption dans un appartement du centre-ville où les quatre hommes étaient en réunion, firant à bout portant sur leurs victimes. Blessé à la mâchoire, le quatrième homme a pu sortir de l'immeuble et remettre une enveloppe contenant de l'argent à un Kurde iranien qui arrivait pour participer à la

« Désastre »

Les trois victimes sont le secrétaire Les trois victimes sont le secretaire général du PDK, Abdoul Rahman Kassemlou, 59 ans, son adjoint Abdoullah Ghaderi Azar et un Kurde irakien, Mahmoud Rasoul Fadil Mala. «C'est un désastre», a déclaré un représentant du PDK à Paris, où M. Kassemlou vivait habituellement.

Le détenteur du passeport diplomatique iranien, qui s'est évanoui dans la rue après avoir remis 9000 dollars au cinquième homme, a été hospitalisé, incapable de parler. Son collègue, qui a reçu l'argent, est interroge par la police.

Les assassins ont pu s'enfuir mais trois pistolets, qui ont probablement servi à l'attentat, ont été retrouvés dans une poubelle et par terre dans un autre quartier de Vienne.

La police a précisé ne pas avoir de preuves que des services secrets étrangers aient été impliqués dans cette affaire. Un journaliste autri-chien qui avait récemment interviewé M. Kassemiou a déclaré que ce dernier était favorable à une solution politique, plutôt que militaire, au conflit entre les Kurdes et le gouvernement iranien. Notons que le président du PDK, Massoud Barzani, avait échappé à une tentative d'attentat il y a dix ans à Vienne.



Le secrétaire général du PDK, Abdoul Rahman Kassemlou, IKey

Cumhuriyet

Kassemlu cinayeti İki İranlı için tutuklama karari



yet) - Viyana'da geçen perşenibe gunu, İran Kürdistan Demokrat Partisi Genel Sekreteri Abdül

Rahman Kassemlu ve iki arkada-

şının öldürülmesi olayıyla ilgili

liği'nde çalışan iki İranlı için tu-

tuklama emri çıkarıldığı bildiril-

di. Bu arada Kassemlu'nun cena-

zesi dün Paris'e getirildi. Parti şiyasi būrosu adına bir basın toplantısı düzenleyen örgütün üst

düzey iki yetkilisi, bir kez daha

Tahran rejimini, Kassemlu'yu tu-

zağa düşürüp öldürtmekle suçla-

dılar. Tahran radyosu da dün dı-

sisleri yetkililerine dayanarak ver-

diği haberde İran hükümetinin

būtūn görüşme çabalarına rağ-

men Avusturya polisinin emper-

yalist propaganda ve devrim kar-

siti grupların önerilerine uyarak

böyle bir karar aldığını öne sür-

ne göre Avusturya polisi perşem-

be gecesi cinayet yerinde Kürt li-

derlerle görüşme yapmak üzere

gelen bir Kürdün tutuklandığını hatırlatı. İran muhalefet kaynak-

larının bu kişinin Tahran ajanı ol-

duğu yolundaki iddialarına rağ-

men Avusturya polisi soz konu-

su Kürt ile polis tarafından sui-

kasta karıştığı henüz kesin olarak

belirlenemeyen bir başka kişi için

AA'nın Viyana çıkışlı haberi-

Iran Kürdistan Demokrat Partisi Genel Sekreteri Abdül Rahman Kassemlu ve iki arkadasının Viyana'da öldürülmesi olayıyla ilgili olarak Iran'ın Viyana Büyükelçiliği'nde çalışan iki İranlı için tutuklama emriçikarıldı,

VİYANA/PARİS (Cumhuri- tafa Hacıfadi,

Sabetay Varol'un haberine gö-re Paris'te bir basın toplantısı dü-zenleyen İKDP Siyasi Bürosu' ndan Abdullah Hasanzade, Kassemlu'nun siyasi bir çözüm bulolarak İran'ın Viyana Büyükelçimak amacıyla İran rejimi temsilcileriyle müzakere başlattığını, geçen yılın son günlerinde yapışlan ilk iki toplantıdan sonra tarafların Viyana'da 12-13 temmuz tarihlerinde bir araya geldiklerini vurguladı.

Iran'ın, cinayeti Halkın Mücahitleri, ya da Irak hükümetine mal etmeye çalıştığını bir soru üzerine dile getiren İKDP'nin yeni Avrupa temsilcisi Hasan Serefi ise basın toplantısında, "Kendileri ile birçok konuda görüş ayrılığımız var. Bizi hasım olarak görüyorlar. Tersi kanıtlanmadıkça biz İran-İslam rejimini cinayetten sorumlu tutuyoruz," dedi.-

Basın toplantısında Avusturya polisinin cinayetle ilgili olarak' ifadesini almak istediği iki İran-, lının halen Viyana'daki İran el-, ciliğine sığındıkları ve gazetelerin, bunların İstanbul'dan geldiklerini yazdıklarının hatırlatılması üzeine IKDP'nin iki temsilcisi bu bilgiyi doğrulamaktan kaçındılar, "Avusturya polisinde bu bilgilerin tamamı var," dediler.

Öte yandan Kassemlu'nun cenazesi bugün Paris'teki Kürt Enstitüsü önünde bir süre bekletildikten sonra unlu Père Lachaise Mezarlığı'nda toprağa verilecek. Birçok önemli kişinin Kassemlu! nun cenaze töreninde hazır bulu-

tutuklama emri çıkarıldığını belirtti. Alman Haber Ajansı DPAnın haberine göre Viyana'daki İran Büyükelçiliği'nde gizlendikleri samlan bu kisilerin adları Amir Mansur Bazargan ve Mus- pacažu ifade edildi.



Kayhan (London) 3. 8. 2989

زير فشار جمهوري اسلامي

دولت اتریش تقاضای پلیسوین برای بازداشت صحرار ودی راندیده گرفت

> محمد جعفری صحرارودی، یکی آن شاهدان حادثه ترور دکتر هیدالرحمن قاسطو که خود وی تیز در این ماجروا راضمی شده و پس از دستگیسری در بردارستای در وین تحت نظر بود هائیت از ویس به تهسران منسقسل شد و در بیسارستان بستیری گردید. پس از موافقت متساسات السریشی با ازادی محرارودی، یک ثیم مراقبت ویژه برای انتقال او به تهران، به وین اعزام شده

> ارای صحرارودی در حالی صورت گرفت که پلیس انبریش مصرا خواستار بازداشت و زندانی کردن او در وی بود و از دادگشتری آن کشور نقاضا کرده بود که اجازه مستگیری و بازجویی رسمی او صادر شود ولی دوات از پش از پذیرش معادر شود ولی دوات از پش از پذیرش مصحرارودی که با گذرشانه سیاسی

جانهوری اسلامی به ویزاگذی بود در روزادش دفترا فاسطو از نامیه کشو و بازلامجروح شده وصولا را به غیابان باللامجروم شده وصولا را به غیابان باللامجروم بس از رسیدن شخوارودی

صحرار آوی یک ست حاوی ۹ هزار دلار نشد را که هنتراه داشت به وی تسلیم کرد. بر رگیان که او نیز گذرنامه سیاسی دارد موقعی دستگیر شد که می خواست از محوطه ای که به محاصره پایس درآمند بود بگریزد. امیر متصور بزرگیان هنوز در بازداشت پلیس افریش به سم می برد و تلاش جمهوری اسلامی برای ازادی او به جایی تسید است. به جایی تسید است.

ویایس شهر وین به دست داشتن هر دو نفر در ماجرای نرور دکتر قاسملو مظلون است ولی فشار حکومت اسلامی ماند از انجام تحقیقات لازم برای کشف عاملین این جنایت شده است.

بلیس وین اکنون در تعلیب یك نفر سوم با نام مصطلی الویزی است که گویا در این جنسایت دست داشت. و حسور دستگیر نشدهاست.

جمهوری اسلامی پس از جلب موافقت دولت اندیش برای بازگرداندن صحراردی به تهران، یک تیم پزشکی امنین به وین فرستاه و او وا به تهران آورد.

صحرا روی گفت: دروز اول اینان طرحی اورده بودند برای پشتهاد به صحبت کردند. خود ایشان درخواست کردند که درجلسه دوم پیشتر نوشیج کردند که درجلسه دوم پیشتر نوشیج بدهشد. چون ما گفتی که پنجشیه می خوامیم برگردیم تهران، ایشان از س بدهند و ما ستوالای که داشیم قرار شد بدهند و ما ستوالای که داشیم قرار شد ساعت هفت و نیم شام دعوت بود حدو ساعت هفت و نیم شام دعوت بود حدو ساعت هفت و ده دقیقه بود که ما نشبه در دوبر وی در فقیقه بود که ما نشبه در دوبر وی در فقیم به کردیم س در در حلو در فقاه رشد به محص ایک نفر جلو در فقاه شد به محص ایک خد داد بیش از پال ثانیه شد، به محص ایک شایک بیش از پال ثانیه شد، به محص ایک داد داد بیش از پال ثانیه شد، به محص ایک شایک کرد که خورد به دهاند. به طرف س

یک دست افتادم که بازوید مورد اصب

قرار گرفت و بعد هم افتادم زمین که سرا ماد، دو تا صلی که کنار دستم جرا دالی

BIL PAIS

DIARIO INDEPENDIENTE DE LA MAÑANA

15 de julio-89/

Asesinados tres kurdos del Partido Democrático

VIENA.—Tres dirigentes del Partido Democrático del Kurdistán
Iraní (PDKI), entre los que se
encuentra su secretario general,
Abdel Rahman Gassemlou, fueron asesinados el jueves por la
noche en un atentado perpetrado en un apartamento de Viena,
según informó en un comunicado oficial el ministro de Interior
austriaco. AFP

16. 07. 1989

Irán dialogó con los kurdos asesinados

VIENA.—La embajada iraní en Viena ha confirmado que los tres dirigentes kurdos asesinados el pasado jueves en la capital austríaca, estaban negociando con el Gobierno de Teherán para encontrar una solución pacífica a sus problemas. La Policia sigue vigilando estrechamente las fronteras con el fin de capturar a los asesinos. EFE



Özgürlük ve demokrasi düşmanı karanlık güçler tarafından 13 Temmuz 1989'da Viyana'da katledilen



I.K.D.P. Genel Sekreteri

Dr. Abdurrahman Kasımlo

I.K.D.P.M.K. üyesi ve Avrupa Temsilcisi

Abdullah Kadiri

Viyana Üniversitesi öğretim üyesi

Dr. Fazil Resul'

saygıyla anıyor ve Kürt halkına başsağlığı diliyoruz

Ahmet Abakey, Ziya Acar, Taner Akçam, Çağatay Anadol, Faruk Aral, Nizamettin Anç, Mehmet Ali Arsian, Seydo Aslandağ, Attila Aşut, Ahmet Atak, Ergin Atasü, İ.Metin Ayçiçek, Vedat Aydın, Ergun Aydınoğlu, Mahmut Bakes, Müslim Başaran, Oya Baydar, Gültekin Bekdemir, Mehdi Bektaş, İsmail Beşikçi, Faruk Bildirici, Serpil Bildirici, Çimşit Bilek, Tayfun Bilgin, Tanıl Bora, Bektaş, İsmail Beşikçi, Faruk Bildirici, Serpil Bildirici, Çimşit Bilek, Tayfun Bilgin, Tanıl Bora, Mehmet Emin Bozaralan, All Bucak, Yümnü Budak, Kəmai Burkıy, İrfan Cüre, İikay Demir, Nəcmi Mehmet Emin Bozaralan, All Bucak, Yümnü Budak, Kəmai Burkıy, İrfan Cüre, İikay Demir, Nəcmi Demir, T.Ziya Ekinci, Şerafettin Elçi, Aydın Engin, Hüseyin Erdem, Muzafter Erdost, Mehmet Demir, T.Ziya Ekinci, Şerafettin Gazioğlu, Murat Genç, F. Hasan Gökçə, Fethi All Eren, Tuğrul Eryılmaz, Ümit Fırat, Gültekin Gazioğlu, Murat Genç, F. Hasan Gökçə, Fethi Gümüş, Semih Gümüş, Fatoş Güney, Paşa Güven, Talat İnanç, Akten İnce, Ahmet Kaçmaz, Refik Gümüş, Semih Gümüş, Fatoş Güney, Paşa Güven, Talat İnanç, Akten İnce, Ahmet Kaçmaz, Refik Gümüş, Semih Gümüş, Fatoş Güney, Yayla Mönch Bucak, Kendal Nezan, Ahmet Zeki Ckşuoğlu, Kürkçü, Ömer Laçiner, Polend Mönch, Yayla Mönch Bucak, Kendal Nezan, Ahmet Zeki Ckşuoğlu, Kürkçü, Ömer Laçiner, Polend Mönch, Yayla Mönch Bucak, Kendal Nezan, Ahmet Zeki Ckşuoğlu, Kürkçü, Ömer Laçiner, Polend Mönch, Yayla Mönch Bucak, Kendal Nezan, Ahmet Zeki Ckşuoğlu, Kürkçü, Ömer Laçiner, Polend Mönch, Yayla Mönch Bucak, Kendal Nezan, Ahmet Zeki Ckşuoğlu, Kürkçü, Ömer Laçiner, Polend Mönch, Yayla Mönch Bucak, Kendal Nezan, Ahmet Zeki Ckşuoğlu, Kürkçü, Ömer Laçiner, Polend Mönch, Yayla Mönch Bucak, Kendal Nezan, Ahmet Zeki Ckşuoğlu, Kürkçü, Ömer Laçiner, Polend Mönch, Yayla Mönch Bucak, Fabil Tuşalı, Bülent Ülluer, Kemal Uzun, Berver Tanıllı, İbrahim Tezan, Meta Tunçay, Ahmet Türk, Erbil Tuşalı, Bülent Ülluer, Kemal Uzun, İspari Verni, İspari Verni, Nezan Çeki Tuşalı, Bülent Ülluer, Kemal Uzun, İspari Verni, İspari Verni, Yuzun Ömer Verni, Alalılı Yüxel

THE TIMES sat. july 15 1989

DR ABDORRAHMAN QASSEMLOU Leader of the Kurds of Iran

Dr Abdorrahman Qassemlou, General-Secretary of the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran, was assassinated in Vienna on July 13, during a European tour. He was 58.

He was one of the most important Kurdish political figures of his generation. A moderate politician demanding only a modest degree of autonomy for the country's three-million-strong Kurdish minority, he was nevertheless rejected by the new revolutionary regime in 1979. When, later, war broke out between Iran and Iraq, his several thousand guerrillas often tied down upwards of 200,000 Iranian troops.

He was born in December 1930 into a landowning family in the Qassemiou Valley near the city of Rezaich (now again called Urmia) and went to school in the city. While still a schoolboy, he was inspired by the uprising of the Kurds under President Mohammad Qazi, the founder of the KDPI. After the hanging of President Qazi in 1947, he went to Iraq and eventually found himself a left-wing exile in Europe, where he studied economics at Paris and Prague.

He was then engaged in



at leading Kurdish uprisings in Iran in the 1960s and 1970s while based in Prague and teaching at the university there. In 1973, he was elected the leader of the party and moved to Paris in 1976 to teach Kurdish at the Sorbonne. By then he had become disillusioned by the Soviet Union.

Five months before the Iranian revolution in Feburary, 1979, he returned to Kurdistan where he set up numerous branches of the several unsuccessful attempts party. His supporters captured

large amounts of arms from the army and police stations during the revolution and subsequently large areas of western Iran, including many towns. Eventually, however, the Iranian army and Revolutionary Guards were able to break the back of the movement even before the war with Iraq came to an end in July exists mainly in the form of roaming guerrilla bands.

Dr Qassemlou received some material support from Iraq but retained enough independence to to antagonize that government by condemning its use of chemical weapons against the Kurds of Iraq. Consequently he remained on friendly terms with most Iraqi Kurdish leaders.

Speaking eight Middle Easthe was by far the most educated leader that the Kurds have ever produced. He was also extremely good company, believing in having a good time whenever possible. During his annual visits to Paris. he could often be seen in the pavement cafes in the centre of the city drinking into the small hours, surrounded by poets and poetesses. He leaves two daughters.

Samedi 15 et dimanche 16 juillet 1989

RIBUNE DE GENEVE

ANTI-IRANIEN NOTOIRE

Un chef kurde abattu à Vienne

Le dirigeant du Parti démocratique kurde en Autriche et deux autres membres du parti ont été tués jeudi soir au cours d'une fusillade dans un appartement, a-t-on appris de source policière.

Selon les informateurs, qui ont requis l'anonymat, Abderrahman Ghassemlou, le chef du Parti kurde anti-iranien et ses deux compagnons ont été tués d'une balle dans la tête, à bout portant. Il s'agit apparemment d'une « exécution punitive », selon les sources.

«Des fins politiques»

La radio autrichienne a annoncé que la fusillade avait « des fins politiques » et que les agresseurs avaient pu prendre la fuite.

La police, qui a ouvert une enquête, déclare ignorer les motifs de la fusillade, qui a fait en outre un blessé grave, une personne atteinte au front et hospitalisée dans un état grave.

talisée dans un état grave. La minorité ethnique kurde repré-

sente quelque 20 millions de personnes vivant en Turquie, Iran, Irak, ainsi que des enclaves de 500.000 habitants chacune en Syrie et en URSS. Les Kurdes irakiens, iraniens et turcs exigent que leurs gouvernements centraux leur accordent l'autonomie.

Le Parti démocratique kurde est leur principale formation politique: une aile du parti combat le gouvernement irakien, et l'autre le gouvernement iranien à Téhéran.

La guerre des Kurdes

Abderrahman Ghassemlou, qui avait passé plusieurs années en France, était le leader de l'aile iranienne du parti, nors la loi. Lui est ses compagnons vivaient en Autriche en exil politique.

vaient en Autriche en exil politique.

Il avait déclaré en avril dernier dans une interview à un journal autrichien souhaiter la poursuite de «la guerre des Kurdes contre Téhéran et Bagdad», en dépit du cessez-le-feu intervenu dans le Golfe Persique. (AP)

Kurdenmorde: Terrorkommando rengte Wiener Geheimtreffe




Killer stürmten die Wohnung und begannen wortlos zu schießen

Vom Mordkommando fehit jede Spur, nur die Waffen wurden gefunden. Der einzige Überlebende des Blutbades ist kaum ansprechbar. (Berichte Seite 18 und 19.)



Der schreckliche Ter-rorüberfall auf das geheime Treffen der kur-dischen Exil-Politiker am Donnerstag war nicht der erste Überfall dieser Art

Nicht das erste Attentat



UNABHANGIG

Offizier als Kronz

Terroriberfalls in Wien handelt es sich um einen hohen Offizier der iranischen Revolutionsgarden. Er wurde ausgeschickt, um mit führenden Politikern der Demokratischen Kurdenpartei Persiens (DNP) über eine mögliche Annäherung zu verhandeln. Gerade in dem Moment, als eine Einigung nahe schien. Wien 19, Muthgasse 2, Telefon 36 01-0 kamen die Killer. Trotz einer Großfahndung der Polizei fehlt von dem Mordkommando jede Spur.

Thema des hochrangigen Geheimtreffens in einer Wohnung in der Linken Bahngas-se 5 in Wien-Landstraße am Donnerstag abend war nach Angaben der iranischen Botschaft die Frage, ob Dr. Abdul Ghassemiou (59), der im Irak stationierte Vorsitzende der DKP, freies Geleit für die Ein-

reise nach Persien bekommt. Eigens für dieses Treffen wurde der für Kurdenfragen zuständige iranische Offizier Abdullah Rahimi nach Wien geschickt. Wie berichtet, über-lebte Abdullah Rahimi als ein-ziger der in der Wohnung An-wesenden das Attentat. Er wurde am Kiefer schwer verletzt und wird derzeit in der Hals-Nasen-Ohren-Abteilung des Franz Josefs Spitals von Polizisten rund um die Uhr bewacht. Von ihm erhoffen Kriminalisten weitere Aussagen.



Der ermordete Kurdenführer Dr. Abdul Ghassemlou (59), im Bild links, während einer Besprechung mit befreundeteten Politikern in deren Hauptquartier in der iranischen Stadt Mahabad.

Dr. Ghassemlou und ein weiterer Politiker der DKP, Abdullah Ghaderi-Azar (37), sowie der in Wien lebende und am Institut für internationale Politik beschäftigte Mahmoud Fadel Rasoul (38) wurden von dem Terrorkommando durch gezielte Schüsse aus schallgedämpften Pistolen getötet.



- DIMANCHE 18-LUNDI 17 JUILLET 1989

L'assassinat d'Abdel Rahman Ghassemlou à Vienne

Le mouvement autonomiste kurde iranien décapité

Le mouvement autonomiste kurde iranien décapité, la question se pose de savoir qui a commandité l'assassinat de l'animateur principal de ce mouvement, Abdel Rahman Ghassemiou, tué, jeudi soir 13 juillet, de deux balles dans la tête dans un appartement viennois en compagnie de deux autres personnes (le Monde du 15 juillet), Secrétaire général du Parti démocratique du Kurdistan d'Iran (PDKI), ia plus importante formation kurde en lutte contre le régime islamique dès l'accession au pouvoir de l'imam Khomeiny, en 1979, Abdel Rahman Ghassemiou ne manquait pas d'ennemis, jusqu'au sein de son parti.

Contesté par certains dirigeants du PDKI - qui ont finalement fait scission - pour la façon autoritaire dont, selon eux, il menait ses peshmergas (combattants kurdes), Ghassemlou a toujours affiché publiquement sa préférence pour une solution négociée de la question kurde, y compris au plus fort des combats qui opposaient ses hommes aux gardiens de la révolution islamique ou à l'armée régulière iranienne. Tout au long de ces dix années de lutte pour l'« autonomie dans la démocratie», et malgré la dureté des affrontements ainsi que la sauvagerie avec laquelle Téhéran a souvent traité les peshmergas, le numéro un de la rébellion kurde n'a cessé de tendre la perche au régime islamique. Il y a eu de nombreux contacts entre Téhéran et le PDKI, et ce dès le début de la révolte de 1979. Mais, dans le même temps, le pouvoir central a toujours refusé l'idée d'une autonomie du V

Monde du 15 juin). Il est vrai que, depuis ces dernières années et après avoir un temps remporté des succès qui leur avaient permis de « libérer » une bonne partie du Kurdistan iranien, les peshmergas avaient du abandonner la plupart de leurs positions pour se réfugier en territoire irakien. Cette volonté de garder constamment la porte ouverte aux négociations a déjà valu au PDKI une rupture retentissante avec les Moudjahidines du peuple de M. Massoud Radjavi (lui aussi basé en Irak), qui ont accusé Ghassemlou de « trahison ». Or dès l'annonce de la mort du dirigeant kurde, Radio Téhéran a annoncé qu'au moment de son assassinat il négociait avec un émissaire iranien un sauf-conduit pour rentrer en Iran. La radio iranienne a également fait état d'une dégradation des relations entre le PDKI et Bagdad.

Si la présence d'un émissaire iranien a été confirmée par la police autrichienne, selon laquelle un homme présent dans l'appartement et blessé lors de la fusillade était porteur d'un passeport diplomatique iranien au nom de Mohamed Djafari Sahraroudi, la référence à une demande de sauf-conduit paraît extrêmement douteuse.

M. Radjavi a, quant à lui, rejeté la responsabilité du meurtre de Ghassemlou sur Téhéran, affirmant, sans toutefois préciser sa pensée ni étayer son hypothèse, que le respon-sable kurde avait été « victime des négociations - engagées avec le régime islamique. « La signification de ce crime pour le peuple, les peshmergas et les groupes politiques du Kurdistan d'Iran est qu'aucun compromis n'est possible », déclare M. Radjavi. Des propos qui pourraient passer pour un avertissement.

La oscura trama del «crimen de Viena»

ciones cruzadas entre Irán e Irak la autoría del triple asesinato

EL INDEPENDIENTE / 17

«Sólo los emisarios del iraní estaban al tanto de versaciones, para nosolaro que ha sido el régieheran el responsable de a», el portavoz del PDKI democrático del kurdisan) en París, contactado ono por EL INDEPENresponde asi de tajantea pregunta sobre la idenos autores del triple aseviena. Según este porta-DKI, el diplomático iraní warudi, que resultó herisalto, era un representanmais del presidente del lo irani, Ali Akbar Hafsanyani. Yafar Saharaha sido arrestado por la striaca pero que debido es heridas recibidas en la no ha podido aún resprofundidad a los inteparece ser una persoeve a la hora de desvelar " de esta oscura trama. austriaca ha informado de las armas utilizadas sación española.

parte, el jefe de la notica del Kurdistán ak, Jalal Talebani, que junto a a Abdul Rahalu, en España hace mues, ha acusado en un comunicado hecho público en Viena, al jefe del estado iraquí, Saddam Hussein y a «los círculos que le son próximos» de estar detrás del asesinato de los tres dirigentes kurdos, el pasado jueves en Viena. «Este atentado- dice el comunicado del UPK- hace fracasar una prometedora iniciativa para llegar a una solución pacífica del problema kurdo en Irán».

Estas diferencias en cuanto a la atribución de los asesinatos de Viena, entre las dos organizaciones kurdas quizás más importantes, PDKI y UPK, son reflejo de la peculiar situación de este pueblo atrapado en los conflictos de intereses de los regimenes de los que dependen y frente a los que luchan. Para el UPK, que representa a la más fuerte organización de los kurdos de Irak, el principal enemigo es el régimen de Bagdad mientras que para el partido al que pertenecian los tres dirigentes asesinados, el combate más duro es frente al régimen islámico de Teberán

El cuerpo de Abdul Rahmán Ghasemlú, será enterrado hoy en el cementerio Pere Lachaise de Paris tras haber estado expuesto en una capilla ardiente en la sede del Instituto Kurdo de la capital francesa. (AFP/corresponsal)



en una capilla ardiente en la sede del Instituto Kurdo de la capital Abdul Rahman Ghasemiú, dirigente kurdo asesinado en Viena

13 July 2020



PARIS, SATURDAY-SUNDAY, JULY 15-16, 1989

3 Kurds Die In Shooting In Vienna

Compiled by Our Staff From Dispatches

VIENNA - Gunmen broke into a meeting of Kurdish activists in an apartment here and killed three men, including the leader of an anti-Iranian faction, the Austrian police said Friday.

A fourth person in the apart-ment, a Kurd bearing an Iranian diplomatic passport, was seriously wounded, said Werner Liebhart, a police chief in Vienna.

The police said the dead includ-ed Abdul-Rahman Qassemlou, 59, the leader of the Democratic Party

of Iranian Kurdistan.

Mr. Qassemlou was a critic of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the Islamic leader who died early in June. In a 1986 interview with the French newspaper Libération, he said that Iran had "officially elevated terrorism to the level of a 'national policy."

According to Mr. Qassemlou, the Kurdish party's aims in Iran were "autonomy within a demo-cratic regime, not independence or secession."

During the Gulf War, a Kurdish force of 10,000 cooperated militarily with frag, and the Kurdish party was allied for four years with the leftist Mujahidin Khalq in Iran.

The 20 million Kurds are scattered across parts of Turkey, Iran, and Iraq, with enclaves of 500,000 each in Syria and the Soviet Union.

Mr. Liebhart, the Austrian po-lice officer, said the two others who were killed in the apartment were Abdullah Ghaderi-Azar, 37, a Kurd who the police said had identification papers issued by France, and Fadel Mala Mahmoud Rasoul, 38, who was born in Iraq but has been an Austrian citizen since

The three victims were living in

Austria as political exiles.

Mr. Liebhart said the shooting occurred at 7:20 P.M. Thursday near the city center. Referring to the Kurds' meeting, he said: "It seems that more than four people took part. We have to assume that it was a political discussion."

Mr. Qassemlou, who was educated in France, lived there in exile for several years. He said in an Austrian newspaper interview published in April that the war of the Kurds against Iran and Iraq would continue despite the cease-fire between those two countries that took effect in August 1988.

(AP, AFP)


Mordkommando tötete Kurdenführer in Wien

Drei Teilnehmer eines Geheimtreffens mit Kopfschüssen ermordet / Verletzter hat iranischen Diplomatenpaß / Kurdenführer Ghassemlou unter den Opfern

Wien/Berlin (ap/taz) - Drei kurdische Politker sind am Donnerstag abend bei einem Geheimtreffen in Wien von einem Mordkommando regelrecht hingerichtet worden. Die Opfer, darunter Abdol Rahman Ghassemlou, der Generalsekretär der Kurdisch-Demokratischen Partei (KDP), wurden mit Kopfschüssen getötet, ein vierter Mann, ein Kurde mit einem iranischen Diplomatenpaß, wurde durch einen Schuß in den Mund schwer verletzt. Von den vermutlich zwei oder drei Tätern fehlte nach Angaben der Polizei vom Freitag noch jede Spur.

Der Leiter der für politische Delikte zuständigen Wiener Staatspolizei, Liebhart, teilte mit, daß neben dem 59jährigen Ghassemlou auch der 37jährige Kurde Abdullah Ghaderi-Azar, Europa-Vertreter der KDP, und der 38jährige irakische Kurde Fadel Mala Mahmoud Rasul erschossen wurden. Der Name des schwerverletzten Iraners wurde nicht mitgeteilt.

Nach dem Stand der polizeilichen Ermittlungen von Freitag mittag waren die Führer von mindestens zwei verschiedenen kurdischen Gruppierungen in der Woh-



Abdol Rahman Ghassemlou Foto: A. Taheri

nung im dritten Wiener Gemeindebezirk zusammengekommen. Mindestens vier Personen nahmen an dem Gespräch teil, über dessen Inhalt keine Informationen vorliegen. Offen bleibt daher zunächst, ob es sich um ein Geheimtreffen zwischen Kurdenführern und Vertretern der Teheraner Regierung handelte. In iranischen Kreisen in der Bundesrepublik hieß es, bereits Anfang März habe es ein solches Treffen im irakischen Teil Kurdistans gegeben, in einem Gebiet, das von einer mit Iran verbündetet irakischen Kurdenorganisation kontrolliert wird. Ghassemlou hatte sich in der Vergangenheit für eine politische Lösung des Kurdenproblems eingesetzt, ohne jedoch den bewaffneten Kampf gegen die Regierungstruppen einzustellen. Vor einigen Jahren spaltete sich eine radikalere Gruppe von der KDP ab, die mit den oppositionellen iranischen Volksmudschaheddin zusammenarbeitet.

Nach Angaben der Polizei waren

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Kein Frieden in Kurdistan

Zum Mord an dem iranischen Kurdenführer Ghassemlou

n den kurdischen Bergen herrscht Traus



iyana'da üç Kürt

VIYANA, (DPA)

VUSTURYA'nın baş-Akenti Viyana'da toplantı yapan 4 İranlı Kürt liderden üçü, henüz kimlikleri saptanamayan kişiler tarafından kurşuna dizilerek öldürüldü, kurşuna dizilerek öldürüldi, birî de ağır şekilde yaralandı. Avusturya İçişleri Bakanlığı, şehirde bir araya gelen İran yönetimine karşı Kürt De-mokrasi Partisi'nin (KDP) üyelerinin başlarına kurşun sıkılarak öldürüldüklerini, saldırıyı hangi örgütün düzenlediğinin henüz saptana-

madiğini açıkladı.
Ölenler arasında KDP
Genel Sekreteri Abdel Rahman Ghassemlu'nun da
bulunduğu öne sürüldü. Kürt liderlerinin toplandıkları evin kapısında, kapının zorla-narak açıldığını gösteren iz-lere rastlanmadığı, suikasti dizenleyenlerin KDP liderle-it tarafından ri tarafından tanınan kişiler oldukları ihtimali üzerinde durulduğu belirtildi. Önceki akşam meydana gelen olay ile ilgili ğeniş bilgi vermekten kaçınan Viyana Emniyet

Müdürlüğü ve Avusturya İçişleri Bakanlığı yetkilileri, olaydan sonra başkentte sıkı önlemler alınarak saldırganların aranmaya başlandığını açıkladılar. Öldürülenler arasında bulunduğu iddia edilen Abdel Rahman Ghassem-lu'nun İran yönetimine karşı çıkanların lideri olduğu ve uzun süreden beri Fransa'da yaşamakta olduğu belirtildi. Avusturya İçişleri Bakanlığı, 3 Kürt liderinin öldüğü ve bir kişinin de ağır şekilde ya-ralandığı olay ile ilgili soruşturmaları sürdürüyor.

Vienna: per l'uccisione del leader curdo mandato di cattura contro due iraniani

VIENNA - (r.e.) Intrigo internazionale dietro l'uccisione di Abdul Gassemlou, il capo storico del curdi dell'Iran «liquidato» insieme ad altri due compagni di lotta nella capitale austriaca il 13 luglio scorso. La polizia ha infatti spiccato un mandato di cattura nei confronti di due iraniani che sarebbero coinvolti nella sparatoria. Ma i due, Hadjii Mostafavi e Ami Mansour Bozorgian, si sono resi irreperibili. Il primo ha forse già lasciato l'Austria, il secondo (un diplomatico) si trova - secondo fonti curde - pell'ambasciata irahiana. Gli inquirenti avrebbero voluto interrogario ma i rappresentanti di Teheran dopo aver fissato un appuntamento per un colloquio lo hanno disdetto senza motivo.

Gli austriadi mantengono tuttavia un atteggiamento prudente e riservato forse per non voler creare un caso diplomatico con gli irrequieti ayatollah che già hanno protestato per i due mandati di cattura. Questo atteggiamento ha provocato l'immediata reazione dei curdi. Nel corso di una conferenza stampa i portavoce del Partito democratico del Kurdistan iraniano hanno lanciato pesanti accuse a Teheran: dietro l'attentato - hanno affermato - c'è la mano del regime.

Il presidente dell'Istituto curdo di Parigi, il professor Kendal Nezan ha ricordato che la strage è caduta esattamente 40 giorni dopo la

morte di Khomeini (una ricorrenza religiosa particolarmente sentita) e quindi il delitto può assumere il significato di un «sacrifico post-mor-tem» in onore dell'imam. Ghassemiou e i suoi guerriglieri hanno dato sempre filo da torcere al regime degli ayatoliah e solo di recente il leader aveva lanciato segnali di dialogo.

Questi segnali si erano concretizzati in una serie di incontri svoltisi in luglio a Vienna. Queilo del 13 doveva essere un incontro decisivo perché doveva servire alla messa a punto di un protocollo d'intesa tra i peshmerga e il regime iraniano. Al colloquio oltre a Ghassemiou erano presenti un suo collaboratore e un intellettuale curdo iracheno. Teheran era rappresentata da un ufficiale dei pasdaran con copertura diplomatica che è rimasto gravemente ferito nella sparatoria.

Resta da chiarire perché i presunti sicari iraniani abbiano sparato sul loro connazionale. Le ipotesi sono tante: negli ambienti dell'opposizione iraniana non si esclude che la trappola tesa a Ghassemiou possa rientrare in una faida tra le diverse anime che compongono il regime iraniano. Senza contare che Ghassemiou aveva nemici anche all'interno del suo stesso partito e la sua linea di apertura non era stata gradita da alcuni gruppi radicali dell'opposizione iraniana.

Corriere della Sera 22.07.89

VIENNA - La strage dei curdi provoca una crisi con Teheran

VIENNA — Guerra diplomatica tra Iran e Austria. Il capo della diplomazia austriaca Alois Mock ha lasciato intendere di considerare Teheran responsabile dell'uccisione di tre dirigenti curdi. In una intervista Mock ha avuto parole dure per gli iraniani che hanno rifiutato di collaborare con la polizia. Uno dei due khomeinisti ricercati per la strage si è rifugiato infatti nella propria ambasciata a Vienna.

23 d Vr 6994/89

Stockbrief

Der irenischs Steatsbürger Hohacmed Djefari SAHARDODI, geboren am 7. 12. 1956 in Taheran, Boamter des Außenministeriums, zuletzt wohnhaft in Taheran, ist wagen des dringenden Verdachtes des Verbrechens des Hordes nach § 75 StG8 in Haft zu nehmen.

Bogröndung:

Mohammed Djafari Saharoodi ist aufgrund der Gurchgeführten Erhebungen dringend verdächtig, am 13. 7. 1989 in Wien in bewußtem und gewolltem Zusammennirkon mit Mustafa Haji Ajvedi und Amir-Mansour Bozorgian-Asal durch Schüsse aus Faustfeuerwaffen Dr. Abdul Rahman Ghassowlou. Abdullah Ghaderi-Azar und Dr. Fodil Rasoul vorsätzlich getötet zu haben.

Mohammed Djafari Saharuadi varlied Daterreich am 22. 7.

Mohammed Djafari Saharoodi ist ca 170 - 175 cm groß, schlank, trägt schwarze, kurze, dichte, leicht gekräuselte Haare, dunkle Augen und trug zum Tatzeitpunkt Oberlippenhart.

> LANDESGERICHT FOR STRAFSACHEN WIEN 1082 Wien, Lendesgerichtsstraße 11

Attailung 230, am 19, 12, 1989

Dr. Michael Danok

Richter



Tages-Anzeiger - Freitag, 11, Oktober 2013

International

Ausgereist trotz Mordverdacht

Die rechte Hand des iranischen Parlamentspräsidenten soll in Wien drei Kurden ermordet haben. Diese Woche nahm er in Genfan einer Konferenz teil und reiste unbehelligt wieder aus.

Von Maurice Thiriet und Bernhard Odehnal, Wien

Die Konferenz in Genf war gut besucht und hatte für die Gäste aus dem Iran offenbar grosse Bedeutung: Zur Tagung der Interparlamentarischen Union vom 7. bis 9. Oktober reiste sogar der iranische Parlamentspräsident Ali Larijani an. Nach Genf brachte Larijani seinen langjährigen Bürochef Mohammed Ja-fari Sahraroodi mit. Sahraroodi soli 1989 anlässlich von Geheimverhandlungen mit drei Kurdenführern in Wien an de ren Ermordung direktam Verhandlungstisch beteiligt gewesen sein. Obwohl Sahraroodi verwundet und seine zwei mutmasslichen Mittäter verhaftet werden konnten, durften alle drei in den Iran zurückreisen. Seither wird Sahraroodi wegen des mutmasslichen Drei-fachmordes international gesucht. Dennoch konnte er unbehelligt in die Schweiz ein- und wieder ausreisen.

Schwere Vorwürfe

Nun erhebt der österreichische Parlamentsabgeordnete Peter Pilz von den Grünen schwere Vorwürfe an die Adresse der österreichischen und schweizeri schen Politik. «Die Schweizer Behörden haben sich beim österreichischen Innenministerium erkundigt, ob ein auf-rechter Haftbefehl gegen Jafari Sahraroodi vorliege. Das Wiener Innenminis-terium hat bestätigt, dass es diesen Haftbefehl wegen Mordverdachts gibte, sagt Pilz. Dennoch sei nichts passiert, und der Gesuchte sei mit seiner Delegation

bereits wieder weitergereist. Es sei nicht das erste Mal, dass der Haftbefehl der Justizaus vermutlich politischen Gründen nicht vollstreckt werde.



ned Jafari Sahraroodi (Bildmitte) in Genf. Foto: kanadi

Bereits 2011 hat Sahra roodi an einer IPU-Zusammenkunft in Bern teilgenommen. Für die Gemeinschaft der Exil-Kurden ein Affront. Dass ein mutmasslicher Mörder innert zweier Jahre zweimal unbehelligt in die Schweiz habe reisen können, sei schon «sehr merkwürdig», sagt Hiwa Bahrami, österreichischer Vertreter der Demokratischen Partei Iranisch-Kurdistans (PDKI), deren Vertreter Sahraroodi 1989 umgebracht haben soll.

Diplomatische Immunität

Folco Galli, Sprecher des Bundesamtes für Justiz (BJ), das für die Vollstreckung internationaler Haftbefehle zuständig ist, bestätigt zwischen den Zeilen, dass Sahraroodi sich diese Woche in der Schweiz aufgehalten hat, jedoch unbe-helligt blieb. «Als offizieller Delegierter des iranischen Staates im Rahmen der IPU genoss der Betroffene Immunität und hätte somit auf Schweizer Territorium ohnehin nicht verhaftet werden können», sagt Galli.

Ob, inwiefern und allenfalls welche Schweizer oder österreichischen Behörden in der Sache in Kontakt standen. wird nicht offiziell kommuniziert. «Inter-nationale Fahndungsersuchen unterstehen den Amtsgeheimnis und sind grundsätzlich vertraulich zu behan-deln», sagt Galli. Daran änderten auch die Vorwürfe Pitz' nichts.

Sahraroodis Flucht und Karriere seit dem Attentation Wien ist so abenteuer lich wie erfolgreich. Die österreichische Polizei vermutete 1989, dass er die töd-lichen Schüsse auf die drei kurdischen Abgeordneten abgefeuert hatte. Sicher ist, dass er beim Attentat von einem Querschläger getroffen und schwer ver-letzt wurde. Die Attentäter konnten allerdings in die iranische Botschaft flüch ten und rach massiver Intervention Te herans das Land verlassen. Die öster reichische Justiz begann zwar zu ermitteln, doch Österreichs damalige Re gierungsspitze stimmte der Ausreise zu. Der verletzte Sahraroodi wurde sogat mit Polizeieskorte zum Flughafen ge bracht. Als die mutmasslichen Mörder in Teheran in Sicherheit waren, schickte Österreich einen internationalen Haftbefehl aus. Er ist bis heute gültig.

General der Revolutionsgarden

Jafari machte danach Karriere in der Is lamischen Republik. Er wurde General und Kommandant einer Sondereinheit der Revolutionsgarden Pasdaran, die im Norden des Irak gegen kurdische Politi-ker openierten. 2007 entkam er knapp der Verhaftung durch US-Truppen im Nordirak. Zu dieser Zeit sei er bereits Mitglied des Nationalen Sicherheitsrats gewesen, schrieb damals das österreichische Magazin «Profil»: Als Stellvertre-ter von Sicherheitschef Ali Lanjani. Als Larjiani zum Präsidenten des iranischen Parlaments gewählt wurde, nahm er seinen Vertrauten Jafari als Bürocher mit. Trotz oder vielleicht gerade wegen desinternationalen Haftbefehls, der von einem frühen Loyalitätsbeweis dem Regime gegenüber zeugt.

Schwarz sprach in Berlin mit Grün

Die Regierungsbildung in Deutschland bleibt spannend. Ein erstes Sondie rungsgesprächzwischen Union und Grü-nen ist gestern Abend ohne konkretes Ergebnis zu Ende gegangen. Die Par-teien wollen sich nächsten Dienstag erneut treffen. Am Montag werden CDU/ CSU zudem mit der SPD über ein mögliches Bündnis sprechen. Ziel aller Par-teien scheint es, bis zur Konstituierung des Bundestags am 22. Oktober wenigs tens festzulegen, wer mit der Union Koalitionsverhandlungen führen wird.

In Berlin gilt eine Grosse Koalition weiter als sehr viel wahrscheinlicher. Umso bemerkenswerter, dass Kanzlerin Merkel sich die schwarz-grüne Option offenhält. Die Beteiligten hielten sich gestern bedeckt. Es sei eine «offene, sachliche und an Inhalten orientierte-Diskussion gewesen, sagte CDU-General-sekretär Hermann Gröhe. Auch Grünen-Chef Cem Özdemir lobte die «positive Aunosphäre». Kollegin Claudia Roth betonte aber, viele Themen sei nur «ange-rissen» worden. Eine mögliche Koalition aus Union und Grünen gilt als schwierig. Die beiden Parteien haben sich im Wahlkampfzeitweise aggressiv angegriffen.

In der SPD dagegen scheint die Bereitschaft gestiegen zu sein, sich auf eine Grosse Koalition einzulassen. Für Diskussionen sorgte jüngst die Forderung des rechten Parteiflügels, das Finanzministerium müsse unbedingt mit einem SPD-Politiker besetzt werden Es sei das einzige Ressort mit Vetorecht gegenüber der Kanzlerin und «deswegen nicht verhandelbare. Die SPD-Par-teiführung hält solche Vorstösse zum jetzigen Zeitpunkt für falsch. Sie könnten bei der Basis den Eindruck erwe-cken, es gehe dem Spitzenpersonal nur um Posten und Ämter. Über einen allfältigen Koalitionsvertrag mit der Union werden am Ende alle 470 000 SPD-Mitglieder abstimmen. (dn)

Kurdenmorde: Ministerien reichen brisanten Fall weiter

Österreich/Iran. Hauptverdächtiger bleibt unbehelligt.

Wien. Eine schwarze Gedenktafel kündet in der Linken Bahngasse in Wien Landstraße von einem der spektakulärsten Politmorde der Zweiten Republik. Vis-à-vis hatte sich der Kurdenführer Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou im Juli 1989 in einer Wohnung zu einem konspirativen Treffen mit Emissären des iranischen Regimes getroffen, um über einen Waffenstillstand zu verhandeln. Ein Mordkommando beendete jäh das Gespräch - und das Leben der drei kurdischen Unterhändler. Die Täter flüchteten in die iranische Botschaft, nach einer Intervention Teherans gewährte ihnen Österreich die Ausreise einem sogar unter Polizeieskorte.

Gegen ebenjenen Mohammed Jafari Sahraroudi, den Hauptverdächtigen, liegt 24 Jahre später nach wie vor ein Haftbefehl vor. Er erfreut sich seiner Freiheit, auch bei Auslandsreisen. Zuletzt weilte er nach Angaben Hiwa Bahramis, des Vertreters der Demokratischen Partei Kurdistan-Iran (PDKI) in Deutschland und Österreich, als Mitglied einer iranischen Parlamentarier-Delegation bei einer Konferenz in Genf. Er blieb ebenso

unbehelligt wie zuvor in Italien oder später in Kroatien.

Die PDKI ist in der Causa Sahraroudi bei den österreichischen und Schweizer Behörden vorstellig geworden, ist dabei aber abgeblitzt. Das Außenministerium in Wien erklärt sich unzuständig. Es sei ungewiss, so Sprecher Martin Weiss, welcher Art der Haftbefehl sei oder ob er überhaupt noch aufrecht sei. Im Übrigen ressortiere der Fall im Justizministerium, wo sich die Justizbehörden auf EU-Ebene damit beschäftigen würden. Aus dem Palais Trautson, dem Sitz des Justizministeriums, verlautet dagegen kurz und bündig: "Keine Auskunft."

Es ist ein Paradebeispiel dafür, wie Österreich brisante Fälle handhabt, wie sich die Behörden eine "heiße Kartoffel" zuspielen. Im Gegensatz zu Deutschland, wo die iranischen Täter der Kurdenmorde 1992 im Mykonos-Prozess zur Rechenschaft gezogen worden sind, harren die Kurdenmorde in Wien weiter der Aufklärung. Grün-Politiker Peter Pilz äußerte gar den Verdacht, der damalige Präsident Mahmoud Ahmadinejad sei der Drahtzieher der Aktion gewesen. (vier)

del 30.06.2004

Mandato di cattura internazionale

Il cittadino iraniano Mohammed Djafari SAHAROODI, nato il 07.12.1958 a Teheran, funzionario del Ministero degli Esteri, ultima residenza presso l'Ambasciata iraniana a Vienna, è da arrestare perché gravemente sospettato di omicidio ai sensi dell'art. 75 del codice penale austriaco.

Motivazione:

In base alle indagini svolte, Amir Mansour BOZORGIAN-ASSL è gravemente sospettato di aver ucciso con premeditazione ed in concorso consapevole e voluto con Mustafa Haji AJVADI e Amir Mansour BOZORGIAN-ASSL a colpi di arma da fuoco le seguenti persone: Abdul Rahman GHASSEMLOU, Abdullah GHADERI-AZAR e Fadil RASOUL.

Mohammed Djafari SAHAROODI ha lasciato l'Austria in data 22.07.1989 per l'Iran.

Mohammed Djafari SAHAROODI è alto circa 170-175 cm. È magro, ha i capelli neri corti e fitti, leggermente arricciati. Ha gli occhi scuri e al momento del delitto portava i baffi.

> TRIBUNALE PENALE DI VIENNA 1082 Vienna, Landesgerichtsstrasse 11 Sezione 23d, li 19.12.1989

> > Dr. Michael DANEK Giudice

Wiener Kurdenmorde: Hauptverdächtiger unbehelligt in Europa unterwegs

Betretenes Schweigen

Von Hülya Tektas

Österreichisches Justizministerium verweigert Auskunft zu dem Fall.

Wien. Der Hauptverdächtige der Wiener Kurdenmorde vor 24 Jahre soll sich in Europa aufhalten. Dies vermeldeten Vertreter der Demokratischen Partei Kurdistan-Iran. Mohammad Jafari Sahraroudi, gegen den seit Dezember 1989 ein internationaler Haltbefehl besteht und der heute Bilrochef des Iranischen Parlamentspräsidenten ist, sei diese Woche zu einem Treffen der "Interparlamentarischen Union für internationale Schledsgerichtsbarkeit* in Genf als Mitglied der tranischen Delegation gereist. Mittlerweile soll er sich in Kroatien aufhalten.

Dass Sahraroudi sich in Europa befindet, erfuhr Hiwa Bahrami, Vertreter der Demokratischen Partei Kurdistan-Iran (PDKI) von einer anonymen Quelle. Bahrami hätte durch die Überprüfung der Fotos auf der offiziellen Homepage des tranischen Parlaments dessen Identität feststellen können, sagte der 38-Jährige gegenüber der "Wiener Zeitung".

Ich habe sofort das österreichische Innen und Außenminis-terien kontaktiert. Sahraroudi, der keine parlamentarische Immunität besitzt, hätte von der Schweizer Regierung nach Öster-

reich ausgeliefert werden sollen". sagt Bahrami. Obwohl das österreichische Innenministerium ge-genüber Schweizer Behörden den aufrechten Haftbefehl bestätigt hätte, hätte Sahraroudi ohne Probleme aus der Schweiz ausreisen können und halte sich derzeit vermutlich gemeinsam mit der Delegation in Zagreb auf.

Schweiz: Genoss Immunität

Am 13, Juli 1989 war in einer Wie ner Privatwohnung der Chef der Kurdischen Demokratischen Partel-Iran, Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou, mit seinem Stellvertreter Abdullah Ghaderi-Azar und dem in Österreich eingebürgerten Kurden Fadel Rasoul bel einem Geheimtreffen mit Emissären Führung in Teheran ermordet worden. Die Tatverdachtigen tauchten in der iranischen Botschaft unter und konnten nach Interventionen der Iranischen Regierung unbeheiligt ausreisen; einer von ihnen wurde sounter Polizeischutz zum Schwechater Flughafen geleitet.

Vertreter der iranischen Kurden bemängeln bereits seit Jahren, dass Österreich bei der Strafverfolgung des Mordes an dem Kurdenführer säumig ist. Die jet-

"Untätigkeit der Schweizer und österreichischen Behörden" deute daraufhin, dass diese politisch motiviert sei: "Wenn die ös-terreichische Behörden es wollten, hätten sie die Morde schon längst aufklären können. Warum haben die Schweizer Behörden es verzögert, Sahraroudi festzuneh-men?" Bahrami mutmaßt, dass man die politischen Beziehungen zum Iran nicht gefährden wolle und diese wichtiger seien als die Beziehungen mit den Kurden. "Dabei wäre die Verhaftung Sahraroudis ein klares Zeichen gegen den Kampf des internationalen



Das österreichische Justizminis-

terium wollte zu dem Fall keine

Auskunft geben, das Außenminis-

terium verwies auf Ersteres. Folco

Galli vom Bundesamt für Justiz in

der Schweiz sagte zur "Wiener Zei-

tung", dass internationale Fahn-

dungsersuchen dem Amtsgeheim-

nis unterstünden und er daher keine Auskumft geben könne, auch

nicht, ob es einen Austausch mit

den österreichischen Behörden ge-

geben hätte. Galli gab aber an,

dass Sahraroudi als "offizieller tra-

nischer Delegierter im Rahmen

dieser Tagung Immunität genoss

und in der Schweiz gar nicht ver

Auch die Witwe Ghassemlous fordert seit Langem Aufklärung, Fecusion

Kredityersicherer nach der Krise noch stärker im Geschäft

Wien. (ag/wak) Die Weltwirtschaftskrise von 2008 hat auch bel den Kredit- und Investitionsversicherern deutliche Spuren hinterlassen, sagte der Präsident der Berner Union, Johan Schrijver, der anlässlich der Jahresversammlung in Wien war. Angst sitzt den Exporteuren aber noch im Nacken: Die gesamte versicherte Summe ist auf zuletzt (2012) 1,33 Billionen Euro gestiegen. 2008 waren es nur 1,1 Billionen Euro, danach kam eine Delle. 2009 war für die Branche einschneidend, die Ansprüche, die ausgezahlt werden mussten, verdoppelten sich aufgrund der vieien Ausfälle – von 1,7 Milliarden Euro auf vier Milliarden Euro.

Die Berner Union ist ein Zusammenschluss von 76 Kreditund Investitionsversicherern aus 60 Staaten, staatlich und privat, die gemeinsam etwa zehn Prozent der weltweiten Exporte versichern. Sie stellen damit "mehr als die Hälfte" der weltweiten Exportversicherungen. Schrijver war anlässlich der Jahresversammlung in Wien. Aus Österreich ist die Oesterreichische Kontrollbank (OeKB) dabei in Gestalt von DeKB-Chef Rudolf Scholten, Laut Scholten sind die höchsten Ausfälle nicht in den Hochrisiko-Ländern zu verzeichnen. Dort seien Investoren sehr vorsichtig. Am riskantesten sel es in den Boom-Ländern, wo Investoren in Goldgräberstimmung manchmal die nötige Vorsicht vergessen.



In 1989 when ARG decided to go and meet his nemesis in Vienna, he may have been reckless. He may have made the controversial decision to go anyway, but he knew the risks because he had been publicly warned 10 years before that he was being condemned to death, while simply watching television.

On Iranian television that day - August 19, 1979 - none other than the Ayatollah Khomeini had come to the opening session of the Constitutional Council of Experts in Tehran. This Council was going to design a Constitution for the new Islamic Republic.

Imagine the scene the television camera is broadcasting: The hall is full of venerable ulemas, their heads covered with turbans and their faces somber as they listen to the Imam.

Khomeini at the podium, with his thick eyebrows, is speaking in his soft monotonous voice; a tone he also used to express great anger.

A few days earlier, armed Kurds had defeated his troops in Iranian Kurdistan. Irate, Khomeini threatened the army with punishment and declared himself Commander in Chief of the armed forces.

Looking at the silent audience, he said: "Ghassemlou is the culprit. The KDPI is a nest of saboteurs and corrupt people. The party is banned. And Ghassemlou must be punished.

Without raising his voice, he asked: "Is Ghassemlou here?"

No one answered as people looked around at each other. Khomeini fixed his gaze upon the Council members and with all the fury concentrated in his carbon dark eyes he exclaimed: Why did you tell him that he was a "mofsed fil arz", a corrupt person! Why did you scare him away? If that dog Ghassemlou had come today, we would have sent him directly to hell!

Reality TV, Khomeini style!

Perhaps in talking today about the many achievements of Dr. Ghassemlou we should begin with the question: Why was he assassinated?

He was assassinated not only for being the leader of the Kurds of Iran, but more than that, because of the type of man he was – his beliefs and the difficult choices he made were unlike those of other traditional leaders in the region.

Different from other Kurds, Dr. Ghassemlou was perhaps the harbinger of real unity among the Kurdish people. His enemies had rightfully perceived his unspoken destiny and this would become a direct threat to them.

It is important to note that, Dr. Ghassemlou was not a traditional tribal leader. His ideological itinerary traveled from an orthodox Marxism-Leninism to Social Democracy in the course of his life. He was an empathetic leader and a cultivated man who spoke seven languages and possessed an inherent strength and wisdom that endeared him to his people. He had a refined sense of humor and loved life.

Unlike other Middle East leaders that fancy democratic ideals but are discouraged by the risks in pursuing them, Dr. Ghassemlou had the courage to manifest his democratic and humanistic vision, as well as put forward his political program within an Islamic society.

Not only did he defend human rights, but also women's rights – long before it became a must in the international scene. In the Kurdish society during Ghassemlou's life, women's rights were non existent – and still they are far from being achieved.

In the unfortunate war in Iraq, there has been one beneficiary: Kurdistan. Although unity across Iraq seems difficult, Kurdistan has managed to achieve an unequalled degree of national unity under the Regional Autonomous Government.

Dr. Ghassemlou recognized that there existed a Kurdish irredentism and that integration was scarce in the countries where they live, that their language was alive despite intentions to drown their cultural identity. The Kurds, after resisting the woes that for centuries befell their nation, began to develop a national consciousness in the twentieth century.

As Dr. Ghassemlou once said, "Nowadays, it is natural to have a Kurdish demand for independence, for the realization of a national Kurdish project. An independent Kurdistan would be a state without access to the sea. Yet at the same time, it would be a state rich in oil and, especially, in possession of unique resources. Water is much coveted in the Middle East and could spark future wars in this region. Without oil, people are poor; without water, they cannot survive. As everyone knows, the great reserves of water are in Kurdistan."

Dr. Ghassemlou was the first Kurdish leader to come up with a solution that overcame the obstacles inhibiting the creation of a Kurdish state and that is why he accepted a realistic plan: to renounce independence and instead choose the path of autonomy.

He understood both the weaknesses and strengths of the Kurds. He was a tolerant man of dialogue who maintained his calm in stressful situations. Because he was respected for his political and intellectual wisdom about the Kurds, including his keen sense of diplomacy and international perspective, his vast culture and his charisma, he was able to bring opposing political parties to a negotiation table.

Dr. Ghassemlou knew that unity among the Kurds was of prime importance. In fact, he was tormented by the division among the Kurds. Politics in this part of the world paralyzed any forward movement. Nothing lasted; no agreement was respected.

For the Kurds had a tribal concept of politics, based on the unconditional support of their chief, not of a particular political program. All of this became the Achilles heel of the Kurdish movement, making it ever vulnerable to the manipulations of regional governments.

Dr. Ghassemlou understood that only through unification could the Kurds achieve their demands. He worked hard for this goal, to end fighting among the Kurds. He was a prudent man whose essential nature was to unify. His impassioned wish was to educate his people and this showed in the respect and love he held for them.

When visiting his men at the military hospital, he knew their names and would speak with them about their family, their village and listen intently to what they had to say.

Long before environmental issues came to the fore, he discouraged his people from clear cutting the forests and unnecessarily killing wildlife. This was a man who once said, "You cannot find happiness; you have to create it. If you don't create it, you will never find it."

This same leader played intermediary between Mustapha Barzani and Saddam Hussein in the 70's; between Jalal Talabani and the Iraqi government in the 80's.

He supported Barzani because he considered him to be the most important representative of the Kurds; yet over the years, Dr. Ghassemlou also questioned his stewardship on many issues.

In an interview, Dr. Ghassemlou once recalled that he had been especially incensed by Barzani's refusal to compromise on Kirkuk in the mid 70's, when negotiating an autonomy plan with the Iraqi government.

Can you imagine that? Barzani turned down Saddam Hussein's proposal, first to give the Kurds 50% of the oil revenues and then 75% -- and finally Saddam made the offer that since Kirkuk was the main obstacle, they should divide the city into two parts. Even today, Kirkuk continues to be a battleground between the Kurds and Arabs.

Dr. Ghassemlou regretted this decision, for he felt it compromised the pan-Kurdish cause. He said: "The Kurds haven't achieved anything politically because they have applied more emotion

than reason to politics. They asked for all or for nothing. You cannot be black or white in politics. What's possible today is not possible tomorrow. I think Barzani should have accepted the Kirkuk deal, consolidated autonomy and fought in the future for the rest of the Kurdish goals.

"If Kurdistan had been autonomous and Barzani kept his troops, when the revolution happened in Iran in 1979, the Iranian Kurds would have been in a better position.

"It's normal that for those who govern Baghdad or Tehran, to want to safeguard the integrity of their country. We Kurds understand this.

"In politics it's not intention that counts, but the relation of forces. If the Kurds had been capable of consolidating their autonomy, Baghdad would have had to accept a fait accompli. The failure of the March 1979 negotiations was a repetition of the failures of Kurdish history. The balance of forces was in favor of the Iraqi Kurds. They should have realized this."

On an international level, Ghassemlou's education and experience made him one of the few Kurdish leaders intently familiar with other cultures. He developed a true knowledge of the West from his education in Paris and Prague. Due to this developed socio-cultural awareness, he was able to justly win the ears, if not the support of foreign powers.

He held a Doctorate in Political and Economical Science and became a professor at University of Prague where he taught economic growth and development. Ghassemlou was an unusually cultivated man who would one day be reading a book of Sufi Poetry and the next a volume on European Literature, listening to a Kurdish song or a Mozart piano concerto.

He always maintained his independence. First and foremost, his primary goal and leading principle was to support the Kurdish cause. Dr. Ghassemlou never accepted the idea that a leader could sell out his Kurdish brothers across the border for the sake of personal or parochial interests. He had not forgotten the lesson of the Kurds in Iran who had been abandoned by their brothers to the hands of the Shah.

And let us not forget how similarly years later, after his death, the Islamic regime in Tehran was given a free hand to operate militarily against Kurds inside Iraqi Kurdistan.

Even though it led an armed struggle against Iran, Ghassemlou's party was perhaps the only Third World revolutionary movement that opposed popular terrorist methods – especially at that time.

About this he said: "As a democratic organization we have always opposed all acts of terrorism, be it hijacking of planes, taking hostages, putting bombs or any action that threatens the lives and security of civilians. To renounce our principles and thus loose our image as a responsible, democratic and humanitarian party, in return for fleeting publicity is both vain and useless."

Not only did he oppose any hostage taking in the 80's, but he was instrumental in the liberation of several French hostages, and even paid for their freedom with weapons on one occasion and another monetarily.

Trapped by the geopolitical situation of Kurdistan, Dr. Ghassemlou had lived and worked in Iraq on and off, and maintained contact with the Iraqi regime. Yet he never collaborated with Baghdad against Iran.

According to Jalal Talabani when the Iraq-Iran war began, the Iraqi government invited Ghassemlou to form a Kurdish state. They offered him money and weapons. Even the budget for the future Kurdish government would be paid by the Iraqis, who would recognize it. Baghdad wanted to divide Iran. But Ghassemlou responded that he wanted democracy and autonomy within the Iranian state.

He was not a 'business as usual' kind of man. Due to his principles, he could not be bought or cajoled into making overnight deals for the Kurdish cause.

He was in a difficult position regarding Iraq. In private he spoke about the horrors of the Iraqi regime, yet he was obliged to be discreet about it publicly.

Almost too modern for his time, Dr. Ghassemlou's political stature was a unifying force. His understanding of the ways of the world and his close ties and relations with politicians, journalists and academics in Europe and beyond, gave him a pragmatic approach that others lacked.

He had also foreseen his own end. For years he had thought about writing his autobiography, but the amount of work and the internal problems of the party did not allow him to do so.

A year before he died, Dr. Ghassemlou told me that if he ever wrote his story, it would have begun like this: "On many occasions, Kurdish leaders have been assassinated due to treason by the Persian authorities. It happened with Jafar Agha and later with Simko, one of our most important contemporary leaders. While Simko's blood ran through the streets in a nearby house, a boy was being born. That boy would be me."

"Did it really happen like this?" I questioned.

No," he answered. "Simko was murdered June 1930, the same year I was born but not the same day. Do you realize how strong that beginning is? One a Kurdish leader dies and at the same time another is being born."

Some Kurds believe that if Dr. Ghassemlou had lived, he would have been able to further the cause for all Kurds. It is difficult today to say what role he could have played.


Were he alive today, there's no doubt Dr. Ghassemlou would look upon the progress made in Iraqi Kurdistan with hope -for its continued solidarity and growth into the 21st century.


One thing is very certain: throughout his life, Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou never limited himself to being just an Iranian Party chief.

He lived as a farsighted leader and above all, a KURD – who held a dream for Kurdistan and overarching love for his people – in the end, giving up his life while reaching for that dream.

We honor his life here today. In these turbulent times, we can remember his unwavering spirit and light that lives on in the hearts and craggy mountains of a nation called Kurdistan.

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"A national community that seeks emancipation shall also pay its price. No nation without struggle and great efforts, without sacrificing its resources, in lives and treasure, has attained freedom. Kurdish nation and our Party, as the forerunner of the Kurdish national struggle, understands that freedom requires commitment and self-sacrifice; the ranks of our fallen comrades ever increasing, and it may to continue to be so with a greater path in the future."

Dr. A.R. Ghassemlou

This is a casual translation of late Dr A.R. Ghassemlou's words, the Secretary-general of the KDPI, from Kurdish into English. The last sentence seems to have the merit of apparent certainty as he himself lost his life in the unpleasant tragedy of July 13, 1989. In fact what happened on July 13, 1989, was a carefully drafted plan of assassinating Dr. Ghassemlou by Iranian authorities under the pretext of political negotiation.

We gathered here to honour his memories and celebrate his works and achievements. Any attempt to shed some lights on the works and achievements of Dr. Ghassemlou would immediately generate uneasy discussion. This is because the real Dr. Ghassemlou I knew was far from the myth constructed by some of his colleagues on the one hand, and a notorious character that had been portrayed by his foes and rivals on the other hand. The existing and real Dr. Ghassemlou was neither of them. He was a human being with his own strengths and weaknesses. He has been recorded as a great leader in the contemporary Kurdish history, and rightly so. However, to aim to reflect on his personality and to try

saying something about his real and actual character and separating it from the myth made by some of his friends or the negative portrait that heavily publicised by his foes and rivals will not be an easy task if I try to avoid saying it is a daunting task.

On the other hand, the uneasiness comes from the way in which he lost his life, remembrance that balk 13 of July and looking that a picture of Dr. Ghassemlou's falling body on the sofa while his red shirt stained with blood that any observant can only distinguish the shirt colour from the blood by its thickness would really stimulate distress. But, perhaps, the most elements of uneasiness stems from the fact the terror of Kurdish leaders have become the final solution to resolve the Kurdish question in Iran. And the consecutive Iranian governments in the past 80 years have followed this practice, and the terror of Dr Ghassemlou is not an exception here. Bearing in mind this, one cannot but to become conscious that the terror of Kurdish leaders has been an integral component of the Iranian regimes' policy in dealing with the Kurdish national movement. To grasp the irony here one has to understand a Kurdish Tragedy in the modern times. But first allow me to reflect upon Dr. Ghassemou's personality.

Within the history of any nation, national community or social group there are heroes, elites and political leaders. Heroes are those who devote their lives to the people and they either recorded many heroic episodes in their lifetime or sacrificed their life for the sake of their people. Elites and intellectuals are those who acquired knowledge and academic training in one or more domains, and working towards filling the gaps existing between the time requirement and the norms and values systems of the society and its institutional setting. However, in the given history of any nation there are few who all at once are heroes, intellectuals and political leaders. Dr Ghassemlou's personality comprised these entire three roles. He started his political career as a left activist while he was pursuing his studies in France. He then expelled from France as undesired political character, very much under the pressure of the Iranian government of the time, and forced to settle in Czechoslovakia. There he succeeded to take an opportunity offered to him to finish his studies, gained his PhD in 1962 and from 1962 lectured political economy at the Prague University. In 1970 he paid a visit to Iraq and Iraqi Kurdistan and decided to devote the rest of his life to the reorganisation of the KDP that was suffering from acute political and organisational crisis following the sad end of the armed struggle of 1967-69. In third conference he was elected as a leader of the KDP and until that black 13 July 1989 remained at this post. He has now entered in our history, as a great leader, distinguished intellectual and a hero.

His imprint on the KDP history is in a way that any historian can easily divide the history of the Party since the fall of Kurdistan republic into three phases of pre-Ghassemlou era, Ghassemlou era and post-Ghassemlou era. I personally benefited from his insightful thoughts following the revolution of 1979 I had the opportunity to know him for a short period of time. For me the most noticeable characteristic of his management style was that as an intellectual he perfectly understood the need for a modernising project within the KDP and Kurdish national movement. As a result he had always aimed to promote professionalism at organisational and operational levels. At the same time he was always trying to ensure that his communication approach is prepared for a particular audience and effective medium had been identified and selected for each case. From this point of view his eagle-eyed for professionalism had never failed him to work with the people who could not share his enthusiastic reception to professionalism. This was the most important lesson that I learned from him.

He was born in 1930, and very much was the son of J.K. and KDP School of thought of that time. To make my point I have to stress that by the early 1940s the international and regional circum-

stances offered the Kurds an opportunity to get round of the vicious circle that had been enforced upon them. This period was to be marked by the formation of J.K., KDP and the establishment of the Kurdistan republic. The promising period of 1942-46 was, however, brief and the Iranian government managed to restore and establish the dominant tone in Kurdistan by the late 1946. In fact, there is an undoubted historic significance and topicality to the policy of the two victorious Allied Powers in 1946- USA and UK-, expressing their loyalty to the Persian government and forcing the Soviet forces out of the Northern part of Iran therefore facilitating the sudden fall of the Kurdistan republic. The legacy of this historic juncture had a great impact on the Kurdish politics for the years to come. The ruling elites in Iran, Turkey and Syria continued to deprive the Kurds from their rights to self-determination. At the same time, European countries, and a considerable numbers of progressive forces in Europe were attempting to downgrade the Kurdish question to the only human rights level, completely disregarding the Kurdish nation right to self-rule. He was seventeen years old when the Kurdistan republic fell down. He belonged to the second generation of Kurdish political activists of that period. A generation that inherited the confusion surrounded their political environment as a result of the drastic end of the Kurdistan republic and inhospitable international and regional political environment. As a result of which, he, like many other young Kurdish activists, found a safe refuge in the leftist ideology, particularly the dominant school of thought of the time, the Tudeh Party and pro-Soviet doctrine of those years. However, his affiliation with this policy line experienced some difficulties before returning to Kurdistan.

In 1970 he left his teaching position at the Prague University and went to Kurdistan. After an intensive discussion and negotiation with remaining officials and members the KDP he stroked a deal with them to resume his political career within in the rank and files of KDP. With their assistance he soon organised the Third conference of the Party and was elected a leader, the post of which he held until he lost his life. Considering the difficulties faced the Party following the aftermath of upheaval of the late 1960s, Dr Ghassemlou aimed to win the battle of ideas, strategy and tactics within the rank and files of the Party in exile, as a result from 1970-1979 he had worked hard and put an immense effort towards the modernisation and regeneration of the KDP. He had drafted a new political programme, which had been discussed and passed in the Third congress. Along his attempt to modernise the organisational structure of the Party his main core ideas and strategy centred on the slogan of Democracy for Iran and autonomy for Kurdistan. Since then the KDP name officially turned to be KDPI. Until the late1978 the KDPI had approximately 100 members and based in exile. Following the revolution of 1979 and the collapse of the monarchy in Iran, the KDPI became a mass party and a semi-army in its disposal, and Dr Ghassemlou emerged as a main Kurdish leader with a popular appeal and national credibility. He was one of the main architect and staunch believer in the aim of 'Democracy for Iran, Autonomy for Kurdistan' for which he invested at least twenty years of his life. His new acquired position with a mass popular support; his credibility and charisma across the Iranian political society provided an opportunity to him to implement his aim and dream. So in aiming to assess his political achievements the period between the revolution of 1979 and the 1989 will be a determinant historical period.

Almost immediately after the collapse of the monarchy, there was little agreement between Kurdish nationalists, and the newly established Provisional Government. The Kurds regarded the end of monarchy as an opportunity to rectify their long-standing sense of injustice over the denial of their national rights by state sponsored chauvinism. From late 1978, the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) had revived its organisational networks alongside the Kurdistan branch of Fadayan, as well as newly the formed evolutionary Organisation of the Toilers of Kurdistan (Komala). These mainly secular forces, which were independent of Tehran, in the absence of a central government in-

frastructure dominated the city councils formed following the collapse of the monarchy, and practically governed the whole area. Having armed themselves from a large army barrack in Mahabad, and gendarmerie posts throughout the region that were attacked in February 1979, these groups became powerful forces that challenged the authority of the PG.

By late 1979 two religious leaders had emerged: first Sheikh Ezzaddin Huseini in Mahabad; and second Ahmad Moftizadeh in Senna. The former, a cleric with a history of nationalist struggle called for the formation of a secular and democratic state with autonomy for the Kurds. The latter, a religious but non-clerical person advocated an Islamic state. Since the Islamic regime had been trying to set up a foothold in Kurdistan, they relied on Moftizadeh's line as an alternative to weaken the radical, secular and democratic ideals of the Kurdish national movement. Although Moftizadeh enjoyed popularity among some sections of the Kurdish people in Senna, the majority of the Kurds, supporting a secular and democratic policy, rallied behind the nationalist parties and groups, as well as personalities such as Sheikh Ezzaddin, quickly marginalizing Moftizadeh. The fact that Moftizadeh allied with the Islamic republic and soon marginalized demonstrates that although the majority of the Kurds are Sunni therefore the religious differences played a role in their opposition toward the Islamic republic but the Kurdish political society was mostly secular and remained as such.

The first confrontation occurred in late March 1979, when a disagreement between the people of the city and Safadari, Khomeini's representative in Senna, developed into an open confrontation. The army garrison intervened on the latter's side. On the eve of Nowroz (New Year) Phantom jet fighters from Tehran and helicopters from Kermanshah attacked the city, and a full-scale civil war broke out between the Kurdish forces and the new Islamic authority. A temporary cease-fire was agreed when a high-ranking delegation was dispatched from Tehran to travel to the area. After hard negotiations an agreement was signed. But, this was merely a foretaste of the future war between the Islamic authorities in Tehran, and the Kurdish national movement.

Following the early clashes, the PG was careful to distance itself from the Pahlavi regime's policy towards non-Persian Iranian nationals, even though Kurdish leaders sought a peaceful solution. In February 1979 a state delegation headed by Daryush Foruhar, paid a visit to Mahabad to discuss autonomy demands with Kurdish leaders. In March 1979 a Kurdish delegation, headed by Dr Ghassemlou, went to Tehran to meet premier Bazargan, and then to Qum for extensive meetings with ayatollah Khomeini. During his various press conferences in Tehran, Dr Ghassemlou indicated that the Kurds were prepared to support the PG as long as it appeared to be clearly promoting a democratic policy for Iran, and autonomy for Kurdistan. These meetings achieved nothing concrete. Although Premier Bazargan announced that his government had accepted the idea of autonomy for the Kurdish area but the PG did little in practice to appease Kurdish antagonism. Meanwhile, pressure from Ayatollah Khomeini resulted in the PG using direct military action to crush Kurdish resistance. Subsequently, the vice-premier warned "we do not approve of the independence of Kurdistan in any way. It is the policy of the state not to allow the secession of any part and territory of Iran's land and such an event will be forestalled with unfettered power." This brutal warning to the Kurds was intended for them to realise that any major difficulties they caused to the PG, by challenging the ideological basis of the new Iranian-Islamic state, would be repressed using the full military power of the state.

The referendum that had newly ratified the regime's change of name, to the 'Islamic Republic', faced major difficulties dealing with the Kurdish issue. The Kurds, who were strongly opposed to the change, did not participate in the referendum. Kurdish nationalists infuriated by the temporising of the Islamic regime, which had declined to recognise its separate political and organisational institu-

tions. Equally the regime, especially the fundamentalists, was uneasy with Kurdish claims to self-rule, and waited an appropriate opportunity to disarm them militarily, and undermine their ideology. The Ayandegan affair, therefore, became a pretext for the fundamentalists to deal with the Kurdish issue. Having declared himself commander-in-chief of the armed forces, Khomeini issued a fatwa and ordered the army and the Revolutionary Guard to attack and purged Kurdistan from infidels on 19 August. Following fierce fighting the Passdaran and army recaptured the Kurdish cities, pushing the Kurdish Pishmarga into rural areas.

The fundamentalists had won a battle but not the war against Kurdistan and soon after the offensive backfired. During the three-month civil war in Kurdistan, the government was unable to consolidate their authority beyond establishing a military presence in the major towns, and some military checkpoints on the main roads between them. Extrajudicial executions by the ayatollah Sadeq Khalkhali generated a deep-seated resentment against the Islamic regime. More than a quarter of the population of the towns had left the occupied urban centres to live in areas under the control of the Peshmargas. As a result, the Islamic military were unable to restore order, or to run governmental and institutional offices effectively. In addition, following their initial withdrawal from the major towns, the Peshmarga launched a guerrilla campaign, and frequently attacked Islamic military posts.

By late September and early October, the Peshmargas pushed government forces back to their barracks, and virtually governed the area. Soon after the US Embassy affair, Khomeini made a u-turn over the Kurdish issue, and ordered a halt to military intervention. A cease-fire was agreed between the two sides, and Khomeini sent a message to the Kurds, asking them to join the rest of the Iranian Muslim nation to turn their anger and rifles against the U.S. He assured them of internal self-rule within the Islamic Republic. He then sanctioned a state-delegation consisting of some of the ex-PG ministers to strike a deal with the Kurds, who had formed a Kurdish People's Representation. Interestingly, throughout the negotiations, Khomeini had never recognised the Kurdish delegation's legitimacy.

By the late March 1980, the Islamic republic was preparing to launch its second offensive against Kurdistan. Before I continue I would like to divert your attention for a short while and to take on a topic that seemed to be misunderstood by many people, and then we will resume our journey to the end. The topic is the issue of armed struggle and its blur boundaries with the notion of terrorism as far as the Kurdish nationalist movement is concerned. The rational for this point is that if we are going to talk about Dr. Ghassemlou's legacy, we need to get clear about the boundaries of armed struggle and terrorism. Dr. Ghassemlou not only led the KDPI at political level but he also, as a secretary-general of the Party, had overall responsibility of the Kurdish armed struggle against the Islamic republic. From the tape-recorder's cassette of the meeting of 13 of July one can clearly hear his last words, assertively replying to the conveys of the Iranian regime that demanding an unconditional surrender and laying down the arms, as he is saying that 'we will never surrender our arms as long as you continue the genocide and mass murder of our people, then you can hear the barrage of bullets whistle. And you can have it as a guess that was the end of Dr. Ghassemlou. Dr. Ghassemlou was always ready to negotiate a just, peaceful and democratic solution to the KDPI and Kurdish tenyears-old struggle with the Islamic republic within the existing Iranian borders. Several times on his own initiative he offered the Iranian authorities a peaceful solution, and each time they and his rivals branded him weak. When he showed his strength he was labelled a terrorist. How can we deal with boundaries between the armed struggle and terrorism within the of the Kurdish national movement?

Unfortunately, like most concepts in politics and political theory, this one is contested, in the sense



that there are different interpretations and normative implications. I will try to define the concept in two: broader and narrower senses in the hopeful anticipation that this may help to find the accommodation. In broader sense we may define the phenomenon as a systematic use of force to gain a political ends or aims. In this meaning one can hardly define the use of violence as a terrorist act, because in any conventional war the armies resort to this kind of the use of violence. If we all agree that war is the continuation of politics by other means therefore majority of conventional wars can be defined as a terrorist act if we agree that terrorism is a systematic use of force to service political ends. In this sense, the use of violence can be regarded as a technology not an ideology which is continuously used in the conventional war and armed struggle for emancipation. Then we may try to define the concept in its narrower sense, which is any systematic use of coercive intimidation is used to create and exploit a climate of fear among a wider target group with the maximum negligence and carelessness towards the immediate and civilian victims in order to publicize a cause or achieve a political ends. In this narrower sense, the systematic use of force can be defined as an ideology not a technology, as an end not a mean, and the act can be regarded as terrorist.

The fact of the matter is that under leadership of Dr. Ghaseemlou the KDPI was, and still is, a political force that along other Kurdish forces, most noticeably Komala, was representing the will of the Kurdish nation in the Iranian Kurdistan. In the ten-years-old of their armed struggle with Islamic republic these forces have never advocate a military solution and have always preferred political and peaceful resolution. But when in the early 1980s the Islamic republic convinced that it can expunge the Kurdish question by military means, persisted in its refusal to recognise the right of the Kurdish nation to self-rule, and finally launched unprecedented military attack against Kurdistan, these forces resorted to the armed struggle to defend their people and land. During this period the Iranian military forces committed many acts of genocide and mass murder, e.g., in 1980 the entire population of two villages of Qarna and Qalatan, including women and children, were brutally beheaded.

After this diversion, I hope that it was a helpful one we may resume our journey. By the late March and early April of 1980 when the Islamic regime was launching its second military offence against Kurdistan, Iran was passing through the most violent phase of her recent history. Following the U.S. Embassy affair, the fundamentalists had relatively out of commissioned their nationalist and leftist rivals on two issues, radicalism and anti-imperialism, which coincided with Bani-Sadr's presidency. Although Bani-Sadr enjoyed a popular electoral mandate, he was almost unable to secure a power base, "Politically arrogant and ambitious, he conveniently flirted with different groups at different times. He was becoming a man of all seasons." The Tudeh party, the Fadayan, and the Kurdish forces were all, for different reasons, suspicious of his real intent. Equally the President, being aware of Khomeini's suspicions of secular groups, had tried to distance himself. His most natural partners for his crusade against the rising 'Mullacrasy' were the National Front and the Islamic Liberation Movement of Bazargan. But they did not have much popular support. In practice, his most powerful partner was the Mujahedin. His alliance with them, denied until to the end of his presidency, provided the ground for his final confrontation with the fundamentalists in the summer of 1981, resulting in his dismissal.

This was a marriage of convenience. The Mujahedin saw Bani-Sadr as a useful partner in their struggle against the fundamentalists, a partner who could be easily removed once the fundamentalists' downfall had been achieved because he had little support in the streets. The alliance of Bani-Sadr and the Mujahedin had a deadly effect on the fate of the Kurdish national movement against the regime. Until then the Mujahedin had never tried to establish a base in Kurdistan, and blamed the Fadayan for their involvement in Kurdistan which, according to them, had made Khomeini more suspicious of the radical groups' real intentions. Considering the ideologically hostile approach that the Mujahedin and Bani-Sadr held towards the left-wing groups, in general, and the Fadayan, in particular, it was the worst possible moment to launch another military offensive against Kurdistan.

Khomeini had realised that the Kurds were able to mount a serious threat to the Islamic republic. There were two particular crises, which stand out. The first in August 1979 was when the fundamentalists attacked, and easily out-manoeuvred the secular groups, but faced major difficulties in Kurdistan. The second was when the Kurdish people rejected the Islamic constitution. Khomeini and the fundamentalists knew that the unresolved Kurdish issue had the potential to pose a serious threat to the Islamic republic. Their options were, either to seek a political solution with the Kurds, the most likely outcome of which would have been a Kurdish gain, or to send in fresh troops hoping that they might have greater resolve to settle the issue. The difficulty for the fundamentalists was that even a diluted autonomy represented 'secession', so instead they chose war.

Following the frequent requests of the Kurdish leaders to find a peaceful solution, Sheikh Ezzaddin Husaini and Dr Ghassemlou, met the regime's top officials and Khomeini in April. Once again nothing concrete was derived from the meetings. To appease the regime's hostility they frequently insisted that the Kurds would respect the territorial integrity of Iran. From March 1980 there were many sporadic skirmishes between the regime's military forces and Kurdish Peshmargas, which provided a good pretext for the regime's launching a second military offence against Kurdistan in mid-April 1980, under the banner of 'cleansing' Kurdistan from infidels. Khomeini appointed Bani-Sadr as a commander-in-chief of the armed forces. He accepted the appointment partially because he had no choice, and partly because he shared Khomeini's assessment of the undesirable outcome of Kurdish demands for the Islamic Republic. The troops had been ordered 'not to take off your boots until you have entirely recaptured Kurdistan'. He needed to secure a quick and soft victory, to sustain his claim

to power, but his calculations were flawed. Unlike the first military offensive, the Kurds held their line despite the horrendous scale of hand-to-hand combat.

The war was concentrated in southern Kurdistan and the main battleground was around Senna. The Kurdistan Branch of the Fadayan had actively participated in the fighting, but their leadership was under constant pressure from the Tudeh party, and Mujahedin, accused of not realising the gravity of the imperialist threat, and playing with fire. As a result of this, and two weeks after fighting began, the Fadayan launched a peace campaign for Kurdistan. While their guerrillas were involved in the heavy fighting, the Fadayan leadership argued that civil war in Kurdistan would threaten the unity of the country, and create a gap that would be impossible to bridge. The campaign had limited success. Dr Ghassenlou and the Kurdistan committee of the Fadayan issued a unilateral cease-fire and argued they were ready to stop fighting permanently if the government accepted to do the same. Although, he was not anxious to appear weak, Bani-Sadr had tried to convince the fundamentalists that to continue the war in Kurdistan would result in desertion from the army. The Pasdaran immediately issued two statements pouring scorn on the liberal-minded circles in the government that had deceived the nation over the counter-revolutionary threat in Kurdistan, and argued that they were acting under the guidance of Khomeini, and they would not cease the fight against the infidels until the whole region was 'purged'.

By the 1985, along the cities and towns most of the countryside was under the Islamic military forces. Having lost all the liberated areas, the leadership of Kurdish forces and their peshmargas were forced to move to Iraqi Kurdistan. Aided by Iraqi regime these forces were able to conduct guerrilla operations in both cities and villages. Dr. Ghassemlou remained the leader of KDPI until his murder at the hands of the Iranian authorities on July 1989.

How can we assess the political legacy of Dr. Ghassemlou? He was one of the main architect and staunch believer of the strategy of 'Democracy for Iran and Autonomy for Kurdistan'. As we proceeded he invested all his personal, organisational and national credibility in service of this aim. In the end he lost his life in this venture. From its very outset the Kurdish question had been an important issue, which had attracted the attention of the majority of Iranian political forces. From this stand we may appreciate his persistence in pursuing the strategy of democracy for Iran and autonomy for Kurdistan. To be fair to him I have to admit that the Kurds and their major political forces, particularly the KDPI and Komala, were caught in several predicaments. In fact, Iranian society was not only divided between the fundamentalists and liberals and radical nationalist camps, but these groups were subdivided along on distinct ethnic lines. Or to put it more precisely, these groups were divided along political (the National Front, the Islamic Liberation Movement, the Fadayan, the Mujahedin, the Kurdish parties), nationalistic (Persian, Azeris, Kurds, so on), and religious (Shias and Sunnis). No secular party and major political force has made any serious effort to understand these contradictions and to initiate a joint project to bridge these differences and construct a democratic national front as an alternative to the fundamentalist camp.

In this political environment Dr Ghassemlou persistently pursued his strategy. In the late 1979 and early 1980 he had some hope that the liberal elements within the Provisional Government may convince Khomeini to accept a peaceful resolution of the Kurdish question. Nevertheless, his hope faded away soon as he experienced that the Provisional Government, having derived its authority from Khomeini, was unable to offer any reliable solution to or accept any meaningful political responsibility for the resolution of the Kurdish question. By the late 1980 Dr Ghassemlou had realised

that there is no room for accommodation with the Islamic regime, and that the clash between the Kurdish national movement with its secular and relatively democratic outlook, and the Fundamentalists' strategy seemed to be inevitable. So he persistently worked to form a national coalition in fight against the fundamentalists. His first and immediate partner for this coalition was the Fadyan. From its outset this policy line seemed to be working as the Fadayan (Majority) were in partnership with the Kurdish national movement. However, there was deep disagreement between the Central Committee and the Kurdistan Committee of the Fadayan over this issue, which was finally resolved in favour of the former. As a result they left Kurdistan and joined the regime against the Kurdish national movement.

Last but not least, in line with their non-confrontational policy towards Khomeini, the Mujahedin kept silence over the Kurdish question until early 1981, when finally the fight broke out between the Mujahedin and the Islamic regime and in order to set up a foothold in Kurdistan, out of the blue the Mujahedin leadership offered Dr Ghassemlou and the KDPI a political collation and ensuring that the future Iranian government under their leadership would honour the Kurdish self-rule. Although Dr Ghassemlou had a major reservation about their real intent he, however, took the risk and joined the 'National Resistance Council'. But as you may be aware he was soon forced to leave the coalition.

DR Ghassemlou wholeheartedly worked for and devoted his life to achieve the aim of democracy for Iran and autonomy for Kurdistan. His personal goal was to broaden the concept of the Iranian identity to include the Kurds and other non-Persian national communities. He aimed to make impossible possible. At any rate, his experience suggested that the strategy of democracy for Iran and autonomy for Kurdistan without identifying any serious national partner willing to invest its political and intellectual resources to achieve a kind of democracy that would entail autonomy for the Kurds remained to be futile. Dr Ghassemlou first tried the liberal forces in the national front and the Provisional Government, so did the Kurds, but it did not work. Then he tried the Fadayan, so did the Kurds, but it did not work. Finally out of desperation he reluctantly tried the Mujahedin, but it did not work. We may have as a guess that in the end he had realised that he exhausted all his stock of credit. The Kurds fought hard and well in the war against the fundamentalists. The Kurds were not helped by the fact that, having been prey to fragmentation and utter confusion, in the end the non-fundamentalist camp failed to produce any kind of national leadership to be able to challenge the fundamentalist camp.

In the end, we ask how anyone can comprehend this journey. How anyone may approach the brutal murder of Dr Ghassemlou? How anyone should understand the Kurdish tragedy? A paradox confronts anyone who tries to understand these perplexing and persistent phenomena of 'Kurdish Tragedy'. Many people may have strong reservation and disagree with me for using the phrase of Kurdish tragedy. Of course I am not so much unreasonable and agree with you that Kurds were not the only population subjected to a brutal treatment by the Islamic republic, equally by Ba'thists or kmalist regimes in Iraq and Turkey. But let being realistic, only the Kurds had been marked for total destruction and allotted no place in the New Order installed by Khomeini, Sddam Hussein or Kamal Ataturk. Late British philosopher and social theorist, Ernest Gellner, one of the major authority in the theory of nationalism, has made in several occasions the point that when state and ethnic-group boundaries do not coincide, 'politics is apt to remain ugly'. This was true in the past century and will continue to be true in the twenty-first century. From this perspective the paradox can be easily unravelled, thus with a little effort figure out the Kurdish tragedy in its three interlocked components. If anyone can comprehend that Kurdish strategy was, and still is, an outcome of a process. The process took path by campaign of linguicide, which was the killing of Kurdish language by peaceful or vio-

lent measures. Then this policy line developed into ethnocide, which simply meant to suppress and wipe out Kurdish culture. And these two components logically opened a way for many episodes of genocide. Kurdish tragedy was an outcome of a unique encounter between these factors that seemed themselves quite ordinary and common when the agenda was the construction of one state, one nation and one language in the multinational and multiethnic societies (Iran, Iraq, Turkey and Syria). Unfortunately even today little attention has been paid to our voices. When compared with the awesome amount of work accomplished by the experts and politicians regarding other forms mass murder and genocide, say for example Palestinian, Darfur, so on, the contributions of professional historian and journalists to study Kurdish tragedy seems marginal and negligible.

In the end in order to comprehend the murder of Dr Ghassemlou and Kurdish tragedy, I would like to paraphrase the crucial questions drawn by Everett C. Hughes, a historian and authority in the field of Holocaust. 1) Who are the people who actually carry out this crime? 2) What are the circumstances in which other 'good' people allow them to do it? 3) How can we are able to ensure prevent this dirty work in the future?

I am aware of the fact that I am running out of the time so I reflect briefly on the last point by suggesting three simple points. First, if he was with us today I am almost sure that he would initiate a serious review of this strategy, as he was a realist and perfectly aware of the fact that the strategy of democracy for Iran and autonomy for Kurdistan cannot be achieved single-handedly by the Kurds who approximately comprise 8-10 per cent of the Iranian population. Therefore all Kurdish activists owe him the task of reviewing of this strategy. Second, our European friends, and the friends of Dr Ghassemlou by now have realised that the Kurdish question in all parts of Kurdistan goes beyond human rights and the policy of toleration. A policy of toleration involves leaving groups free to assert their identity and express their cultural values in private or through associations of their members. Then they owe Dr Ghassemlou, who lost his life for the emancipation of the Kurds, to ensure a transparent approach and foreign policy to support the Kurdish nation's right to self-determination. Last but not least, 19 years ago he was murdered at the hands of Iranian authorities but the perpetrators are still at large, so we all owe him the struggle to re-open his case and bring to a satisfactory conclusion. I hope therefore all of you support and approve a resolution that would be proposed by the chairman.

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Daryush Frohar, Kayhan, no. 10650, Esfand 10, 1357, p 3.

The Kurds formulated their request for autonomy in 30 clauses, and see also Sheikh Ezzaddin Huasaini, interview with Kayhan, no. 10652, Esfand 13, 1357, p 8.

Kayhan, nos. 10651 and 10654, Esfand 12-15, 1357, p 7.

The Daily Telegraph, February 21, 1979

Muftizadeh later claimed that the war in Kurdistan was a well-designed conspiracy by the Iraqi regime, imposed on the Kurds. In this way he tried to lift the responsibility from the Iranian regime, though Khomeini was the author and initiator. Kayhan, nos. 10648, 10649 & Aban 14, 1358,

Sheikh Ezzaddin argues that Iran is a multinational country and the new constitution should recognise and guarantee the rights of national and religious minorities in Iran. see for example, Kayhan, no.10652, Esfand 13, 1357, p.8, and Ayandegan, Tir 29, 1357.

Ahmad Muftizadeh was widely seen as a reactionary by the Kurdish groups, and was forced to flee Kurdistan under fierce pressure from the nationalist forces. He was later detained and imprisoned by the Islamic regime, until his release in 1992 soon after which he died in unknown circumstance. There was an unsubstantiated rumour that he was poisoned by the security forces before his release.

Kayhan, nos. 10665 & 10666

The Guardian, March 20, 1979

The Guardian, February 22, 1979

The delegation included: ayatollah Taleqani, Beheshti, Hashemi Rafsanjani, and Abdulhassan Bani-Sadr. Ayandegan, 28, March 1979

Entessar, 1992, Kurdish Ethnonationalism, p. 35.

Dr Abdulrahman Ghassemlou, the general secretary of KDP, was born on 22 December 1930 in Oromiah, North-West Iran. He had a Ph.D in economics, was an associate professor teaching in Paris and Prague. In the early 1970's he left his academic career to become a professional politician. At the Third Congress of the KDP (1973), he was elected as General-Secretary and re-elected until his assassination during a negotiating meeting with an Iranian state delegation in Vienna by the Islamic Republic on 13 July 1989.

Kayhan, no. 10671, Farvardin 11, 1358

Kayhan, no.10674, Farvardin 15, 1358

Reflecting on the early confrontations between the Kurds and the regime, Reuter reported that General Qarani said that the military would never allow any part of the country to secede. The Guardian, February 22, 1979

Ayandegan, 20 February 1979

Before the August offensive against the Kurds, the Premier Bazargan reacted angrily over Kurdish demands saying "they [the Kurds] didn't simply want autonomy; they wanted to be separate from Iran." Le Monde, March 6, 1979, quoted by McDowall, 2000, p. 269

Ayatollah Khalkhali later justified his extrajudicial executions in Kurdistan, 2001, pp. 95-103

Kayhan, Aban 20, 1358/ November 29 1979

Kayhan, Aban 27, 1358/ December 6 1979

Khomeini was extremely careful not to use Khod-mukhtari (autonomy), which was a recognised concept within the Iranian leftist political culture, and instead used the word Khod-gardani which, though it has a similar meaning, is a less radical or secular interpretation.

The Kurdish delegation was 4 members from the KDP, 3 from Komala, 3 from Sheikh Ezzaddin Husaini's Bureau, and 3 from the Kurdistan Branch of the Fadayan.

Kar, year.1, no.36, Azar 5, 1358/ November 26, 1979; Hashemi, Khāterāt, p.365. In Azar 21, 1358, Sabaghyan, a member of the Islamic regime's delegation over the Kurdish issue, announced that the Kurds' rights would only be granted to individuals, but not to Kurdish political groups. Kayhan, Azar 21, 1358.

Milani, 1995, pp. 184-93.

Behrooz, 2000, pp. 136-44

Milani, 1995, p. 185.

Ibid., p.293.

By the late June 1981 Bani-Sadr and the leadership of the Mujahedin had started working together to topple the 'dictatorship of the Mullas'.

Throughout of 1979 and 1980 the Mujahedin followed their non-confrontationalist stance towards Khomeini as a result of which when the Kurds involved in the heavy fighting with the Fundamentalists' forces, the Mujahedin criticised the Kurds and the Fadyan for involving in such dangerous game and warned imperialism was trying to take advantage of 'separatist movements, see for example, Mujahedin-e Khalq, Announcement, Ordibahesht 18, 1358.

The Mujahedin realised that Kurdish opposition to the Islamic regime, coincided to some extent, with their political strategy. However, until late 1981, they had barely supported the Kurds, since they knew that Khomeini's stance against the Kurdish resistance was popular. Therefore, they refrained from supporting the Kurdish national movement in order to avoid antagonising Khomeini. Second-

ly, the Kurds were unsympathetic towards Islamic activism, and the Mujahedin realised they were unlikely to succeed in setting up an Islamic foothold in Kurdistan. Last, but not least, the Mujahedin, as with the rest of Iranian groups, held a very ambiguous view of the Kurdish cause and its demands to the Iranian government.

For an interesting review of the Kurdish- the Islamic Republic relations, see, Butorac. B. (1980). 'Iran's Revolution and the Kurds', Review of International Affairs, (Belgrade), April 31, 1980, and MacDonald. Ch. (1989). 'The Kurdish Challenge and Revolutionary Iran', Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, nos. 1 and 2, Fall-Winter 1989.

The Islamic regime knew that the Kurds opposed the ratified constitution, and the doctrine of valayat-e faqih. Even Sheikh Ezzaddin utterly rejected this doctrine "What we have is not religious government, but a dictatorship under name of Islam [...] It is not an Islamic regime [...] Any religious government will end in dictatorship, and religion will become a means of beating, executing and killing in the name of God". Middle East Report, no.113, March-April 1983, pp.9-10.

For the fundamentalists' position on Kurdistan see for example, M Razawi, Hashemi ve Enqelab: Tarikh-e siasi Iran az enqelab ta jang (Hashemi and the Revolution: the Political history of Iran from the Revolution to the War) 1376, Hamshari Publication, pp. 283-97

When negotiations between the Kurds and the regime had reached an impasse, the KDP, unilaterally tried, much to the dismay of its left-wing partners, to prepare a more diluted version of autonomy hoping it would help to secure an agreement with the regime. It achieved nothing. Dr Chamran, a top military strategist of the Islamic regime, in an extensive three part interview with Kayhan, claimed that the Kurds wanted independence, and concluded 'we have to disarm their militia without any delay otherwise they are planning to secede from Iran.' Kayhan, Aban 22, 1358/ November 13, 1980. Kayhan, Farvardin 16, 1359/ April 7, 1980

Dr Ghassemlou, interview with Kayhan, Farvardin 27, 1359

Kayhan from Bahman 7, 1358 to Farvardin 31, 1359

Kayhan, Bahman 14, 1358/ February 5, 1980

Kayhan, Bahman 20, 1358/ February 30, 1980

Later, whilst in exile, Bani-Sadr claimed that his statement had been taken out of context, and claimed that he was trying to settle the Kurdish question through a peaceful solution, and that his attempt was unsuccessful because Dr Ghassemlou avoided a straight answer. This account cannot be verified by the facts, Khayant be omid, pp. 133-38.

Enqelab-e Islami, Ordibehesht 14, 1359/ May 3, 1980

Kar, year.2, no. 58, Ordibehesht 24, 1359, May 13, 1980, and no.59, 31 Ordibehesht 1359, May 20, 1980.

Kar, year.2, no.57, Ordibehesht 17, 1359/ May 7, 1980

Ibid

Kar, year.2, nos. 58 & 76

McDowall, p. 272.

Kar, no. 59, Ordibehesht 31, 1359, and Financial Times, May 24, 1980

Everett C. Hughes, 'Good people and Dirty Work', Social Problems, Summer 1962, pp.3-10



Thank you Lord Avebury, thank you Mouloud Swara for organizing this event, thank you Asso Hassan Zadeh for your participation and thank you all for being here today.

The first question I usually get from Venezuelan journalists has been: How did a Venezuelan get involved with the Kurds? My first encounter with the Kurds happened in 1982 at the Cannes Film Festival where I met Yilmaz Guney, Kurdish filmmaker from Turkey. It was through him that I learned about the plight of the Kurdish nation. In 1983, I met Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou at the Kurdish Institute of Paris.

My first impression of Ghassemlou was that he was a cultivated, charming and charismatic man. He spoke eight languages. I was impressed by his knowledge of Western art and culture, as well as that of Iran. That night he recited poems by Omar Khayam, and Hafiz in Farsi and then would translate them into French. He was the center of attention; he usually always was, captivating those around him with his humor and his easy way of being with others. His stature and command as a statesman and leader of millions of Kurds brought forth respect and hope for his people.

Ghassemlou invited me to come to Iranian Kurdistan and two years later I traveled there to do a documentary for the French Gamma TV agency. It was then that the idea of a book about the Kurds was born. Who was Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou?

He was the Secretary General of the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran, KDPI. In 1979, when he returned to Iranian Kurdistan, the party was small and he was not a well-known figure. But it did not take long for him to become the undisputed leader and spokesperson for the Kurds.

Due to his lucidity and open politics, he was able to communicate in a way that spoke to the hopes and desires of the population. He rapidly emerged as the ideological leader of the Kurdish national movement. For the Kurds, he became the leader who could bring change to their lives. He engendered and represented national pride.

Ghassemlou gave the national movement a clear direction and he was able to mobilize the resistance against the Iranian regime. His message was clear: he favored an independent Kurdish party that asserted the rights of the Kurdish people in Iran. Autonomy for Kurdistan. Democracy for Iran.

From the outset, Ghassemlou knew who Khomeini was. He had read his books, listened to his speeches. He said Khomeini was reactionary and his political proposal medieval but he "never imagined he could be so blood thirsty."

Even though Ghassemlou was meeting with the authorities from Tehran and went to visit Khomeini twice, he knew that the government was buying time.

In March 1979, Ghassemlou and members of his party went to Qom to meet with the Ayatollah at his home. When they entered into an alcove they found many ministers, ambassadors, politicians, and clerics waiting for the Imam.

Ghassemlou recalled that they were not searched. "We could have easily killed him," he would say with a chuckle. They entered his room and found him surrounded by hundreds of children and women. The Ayatollah, seated on the floor, would take a lump of sugar, put it into his mouth, and then he would take it out and give it to one of the boys sitting next to him.

Ghassemlou went up to Khomeiny's son and told him they wanted to meet alone with the Imam. Suddenly everyone left the room. They spent an hour alone with him.

Ghassemlou explained the situation in Kurdistan and said that the Kurds would participate in the referendum and vote for the Islamic Republic as long as their demands were respected.

"That is not my business, go see Bazargan," Khomeiny answered without looking at Ghassemlou.

Undeterred Ghassemlou said, "That's fine, and we would like you to publicly comment about our meeting."

"Ayatollah Taleghani already made a declaration. What more do you want?" he muttered.

Ghassemlou knew that the Western and Iranian press were waiting outside for them. They suspected that the Kurds were clearly in the opposition.

So Ghassemlou insisted once more saying: "So when I leave here, you authorize me to declare that you agree with what Taleghani said?"

"But I don't know what he said," objected Khomeini and added, "We are all brothers and Muslims."

But Ghassemlou insisted and the Ayatollah suddenly said he was feeling sick and quickly left the room without even looking at the Kurds who got up and left. Outside the Kurds saw the Imam on the roof, waving at people.

Before leaving Qom, the Kurds decided they would not participate in the referendum for the installment of an Islamic Republic, and announced that they would not take part because the ballot question only gave the people one option: to choose or not an Islamic republic.

Ghassemlou was well aware that those first months of freedom after the revolution would not last, and that the mullahs would confiscate the revolution, turning it into a clerical dictatorship. He believed that under the iron grip of the ayatollahs, there could be no democratic progress in the country.

During those turbulent months of 1979, Ghassemlou was building the armed resistance of the peshmergas and at the same time, he was working to reach

an agreement with the government. He always sought dialogue with the authorities.

After the referendum for the Islamic Republic which the Kurds opposed, there was an election for the members of the Constitutional Council of Experts. This body was going to design a Constitution for the new Islamic Republic.

Not only had Ghassemlou obtained 80% of the votes in the region, but he was also one of the three laypersons elected to that body. The clerics and other fundamentalists occupied the majority of the seats.

A few days before the opening session, armed Kurds had defeated the government's troops in Iranian Kurdistan. Irate, Khomeini had threatened the army with punishment and declared himself Commander in Chief of the armed forces.

Because of this tension, the party had recommended that Ghassemlou stay home and not attend the opening session. Sitting in his house in Mahabad, Ghassemlou was watching the transmission on television.

It was August 19, 1979 – the Ayatollah Khomeini had come to the opening session of the Constitutional Council of Experts in Tehran.

Imagine the scene the television camera is broadcasting: The hall is full of venerable ulemas, their heads covered with turbans and their faces somber as they listen to the Imam.

Khomeini at the podium, with his thick eyebrows, is speaking in his soft monotonous voice; a tone he also used to express great anger.

Looking at the silent audience, he said: "Ghassemlou is the culprit. The KDPI is a nest of saboteurs and corrupt people. The party is banned. And Ghassemlou must be punished."

Without raising his voice he asked: "Is Ghassemlou here? I don't see him."

No one answered. With a contained fury concentrated in his dark carbon-colored eyes, he said to the assembly: "If that mofsed fi'l-arz (corruptor of the earth) had come today, I would have had kept him here." In other words, executed him.

The Kurds began an armed struggle against Khomeini and his regime that would last more than a decade. Though Ghassemlou took up arms against the regime, he never believed that violence was the way to achieve his demands. Armed struggle was a means to achieve enough clout when the time came for negotiating.

Ghassemlou was a far-sighted leader; a tolerant man whose democratic and humanistic vision for his nation had left behind the dogmas of the radical left. He was a man who in the 80's, contrary to the revolutionary movements of the time, opposed any act of terrorism that would harm civilians.

About this he said: "As a democratic organization we have always opposed all acts of terrorism, be it hijacking of planes, taking hostages, putting bombs or any action that threatens the lives and security of civilians. To renounce our principles and thus lose our image as a responsible, democratic and humanitarian party, in return for fleeting publicity is both vain and useless."

In 1988, the war between Iran-Iraq was over and Ghassemlou feared that both governments would agree to crush the Kurdish rebellion in their respective countries, as it had happened in 1975 after the Algiers Accord. It was time to sit down and negotiate.

Hashemi Rafsanjani, then president of the Iranian Parliament, reached out to Jalal Talabani, current Iraqi president, to mediate with Ghassemlou. Talabani organized a first series of meetings in Vienna between December 1988 and January 1989. Talabani ensured extreme security measures to protect his friend Ghassemlou.

But soon after these discussions the Iranians informed Talabani that his people had talked about the meetings, and therefore they were halting the conversations. Secrecy was absolutely necessary.

Talabani at the time thought that they were abandoning the negotiations due to the changes in the internal political situation in Iran: Khomeiny's health was declining and the fight for succession had intensified. In this way they deftly put Talabani aside, for their plan was in fact to murder Ghassemlou.

Those first meetings were meant as bait that would lead to a second round of meetings without Talabani and without security measures. So the regime asked Fadil Rasul, an Iraqi Kurd to serve as an intermediary and insisted on the need for total secrecy.

The reason Rasoul and Ghassemlou were probably told was that there were hardliners within the regime that did not want to negotiate with the Kurds.

Ghassemlou took the bait and accepted to meet with the Iranian emissaries in Vienna and did not inform the party. He was convinced the regime needed to resolve the Kurdish question. Also Khomeiny had just died and Rafsanjani presented himself as a pragmatist who would lead a less fundamentalist government. This was Ghassemlou's flawed lecture of the internal politics of the country.

His death resembled that of Julius Cesar who despite all the warnings he received still went to the Senate where he met his death. In the same way, Ghassemlou received several warnings prior to his trip to Vienna. Bernard Kouchner, current French Minister of Foreign Affairs, told him the night before to not go to this meeting because he could not trust the Iranians. His former wife, Helene Krulich told him that Rafansayani wanted his death and he should not go to Vienna. His loyal assistant Abdullah Ghaderi had an ominous feeling and was sick to his stomach the day of the murder...there were so many signs that he ignored. And he went. He was confident and happy after the first meeting on July 12th. On the second meeting, July 13 1989 Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou was killed. He received 3 bullets in the head, Fadil Rasoul, the

intermediary, received five bullets and Abdullah Ghaderi eleven. Ghaderi had blood and skin in his nails; he had fought to his last breath and in this final struggle a bullet probably strayed, and wounded the main Iranian emissary. Because of this stray bullet, it was not the perfect murder.

Two of the three Iranian emissaries negotiating with Ghassemlou were taken into custody. The wounded Iranian was taken to a hospital. Oswald Kessler, of the Austrian national police force, announced to the minister of the interior that it was a political crime planned from abroad. He said "Three Iranians have assassinated three Kurds."

Iran began to pressure the Austrian government to release the wounded Iranian. At the same time a political scandal, the Noricum Prozess was in full swing. It implicated high-level Austrian officials in the sale of weapons to Iran and Iraq violating Austria's neutrality.

It was because of this commercial exchange of weapons with the Islamic Republic of Iran that Austria, a democratic European state, released the witnesses and suspects of the crime covering up a state murder and thus became by omission the accomplices to a terrorist act.

The case was never resolved. In 2005, the Austrian parliamentary Peter Pilz brought forth new evidence regarding the participation of the Iranian regime in the murder and allegedly implicating Hashemi Rafsanjani and the newly elected president of Iran, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in the planning of the assassination.

According to this new evidence there had been two Iranian teams involved in the murder – a negotiations team and an execution team. Pilz demanded the case be reopened and that there be a parliamentary inquiry. The request was denied.

In 2009, Peter Pilz once again accused Ahmadinejad according to a confession of a German arms dealer to the Italian police. This man affirmed having delivered the weapons that killed the Kurds to the Iranian Embassy in Vienna. He also said: "A certain Mahmoud who later became president had been present."

I wrote the book to denounce the assassination by the Iranian regime and the complicity of the Austrian authorities, and also to tell the story of the Iranian Kurds through Ghassemlou's fascinating life. I finished the book in 1992 and my agent sent it to different publishers in Spain, Venezuela and Mexico. The response was always the same: It's a good book, but who's interested in the Kurds? So, I shelved the project.

In 2003 after the invasion of Iraq by the United States, the Kurds became front page news. I updated the book and sent it to a Venezuelan publisher. They published it in 2008. Chavez had become chummy with Ahmadinejad and Iran was an unknown for Venezuelans. Since then, the book has been translated into Turkish, Sorani and now English.

In 1984 I read Ghassemlou a eulogy I had written about Yilmaz Guney after his death. When I finished translating the article, Ghassemlou said to me, "When I die, I would like you to write a book, telling the story of my life and the Kurdish cause."

Twenty six years later the promise I made in 1984 to write his story has been fulfilled and I offer it to you today friends and members of this proud and dignified nation, the Kurds.

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The 25th anniversary of the assassination of Kurdish leader Dr. A.R. Ghassemlou

Ladies and Gentlemen,

It is an honor for me to talk about the struggle for freedom of the Iranian Kurds in this prestigious place. A place of free speech which has witnessed many debates on the long path of democracy and human rights. I would first of all like to thank Lord Eric Avebury for hosting us here. My thanks also go to Mr.Mouloud Swara for his efforts in organizing this seminar and of course Carol Prunhuber for inviting me to be beside her today.

Carole's book is the authentic tale of a crucial period in the history of Iranian Kurds. A story told in a novelistic style, without ever distorting reality. Although the work is devoted to the life and death of a man, Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou, which go back to more than twenty years ago, the details provided are obviously valuable for understanding the current situation of Iranian Kurds. Many of the considerations expressed in this book are still valid today. With this book we become particularly aware of the multiple dimensions that the struggle of Kurds in Iran has. It's precisely to these dimensions that I will devote my remarks.

The status of the Kurdish issue in Iran is the outcome of a game between two seemingly simple paradigms which, nonetheless are essential for the understanding of the Kurdish question in Iran. On one hand, I want to refer to the Kurdish dimension, or as we could say, the Kurdistani dimension of the struggle (I mean by that the territorial aspect of the Kurdish issue). We are indeed in the presence of a people's struggle

to achieve their national rights, but a people who is only a part of an overall nation divided over several States. On the other hand, I would like to refer to the Iranian dimension of the Kurdish struggle. Although the Kurdish movement in Iran is politically centrifugal (a peripheral nationalism as some would say), the Kurds of Iran are not separatists and in that sense, their struggle is inscribed in the general framework of the fight for democratization of Iran.

This dual dimension of the Iranian Kurds' struggle - both Kurdish and Iranian or both national and democratic at the same time – generates conflicting consequences, in both political and identity terms. For the ruling elite in Iran, it is often a source of distrust towards the Kurds, and sometimes, it raises doubts among the Kurds themselves as regards to their allegiance to Iran. It's precisely these tensions that Ghassemlou tried to address throughout his life, to the point of paying the highest price with his own death.

Of all the minorities in Iran (if indeed one can speak of "minorities" in a country where non dominant peoples constitute at least over half of the population), Kurds have the highest political consciousness of their ethnicity. Without mentioning the demographic factors (such as the size: the Kurds are the third largest ethnic group in Iran, or the compactness of the population inhabiting historically a territory called Kurdistan), I would like to evoke two factors in support of my previous statement:

The first factor is the long and rich history of Iranian Kurds' quest for freedom. We can trace the first Kurdish princes' revolts in the 16th century, following the first partition of Kurdistan, even if national movements in the modern sense only appeared during the 1880s and 1920s. But the highlight of the modern history of the Iranian Kurds is the creation in 1946 in Mahabad of the only Kurdish Republic in history. Although the Kurdish Republic was abolished by the Iranian central government before it celebrated its first anniversary and its leaders were hanged, its existence is considered the most significant event in the history and imaginary of all nationalist Kurds.

During the decades following the abolition of the Kurdish Republic, Kurdish resistance to oppression continued, but the Kurds had to wait until the 1979 Revolution to find freedom again. Insofar as the demands of the Kurds were inherently incompatible with the anti-democratic and reactionary nature of the newly established clerical power, the respite was short-lived. Combining military means worthy of an international conflict with the massacre of civilians, the Iranian armed forces implemented the fatwa (or the religious order) decreed by the Ayatollah Khomeini against the Kurds. This forced the Kurdish opposition into armed resistance until the mid-nineties. Even if armed resistance is now suspended, everyone agrees that of all Iranian opposition groups, the Kurdish forces are the most organized and most entrenched among the population.

The second factor explaining the high degree of national consciousness and political organization of the Iranian Kurds, and this is where I am coming to the point of the double dimension of the struggle, is the existence of two fields of identification and interaction relevant to the political behavior of the Iranian Kurds. There is indeed a Kurdish national identity that transcends territorial division and links of various nature unite Kurds across borders. The Kurds of Iran are far from being indifferent to what happens in other parts of Kurdistan, they are very interested in the democratization processes in other countries where Kurds live and their organizations sometimes adopt strategies taking into consideration the situation existant in other parts of Kurdistan. However, this sense of solidarity among the Kurds of Iran and those of other parts of Kurdistan has no radicall political consequences. Indeed, while feeling they belong to an overall nation - namely the Kurdish Nation-, the Iranian Kurds' political interaction is mainly with the Iranian central power or more generally with Iran's political elite. Paradoxically, while the reference to the Kurdish Nation is common among Kurdish elites, including those of Iran, the Iranian Kurds' political discourse is the least based on the concept of self-determination, due to the independence related connotations of this idea. Since the mid-twentieth century, the most important forces of the Kurdish movement in Iran as in other parts of Kurdistan have been fighting for the political and constitutional recognition of the Kurdish rights, be it in the form of autonomy or federalism, but in any case without calling into question Iran's territorial integrity. The Kurds of Iran have, in fact, never given up adopting constructive methods and integrationist approaches by participating, whenever they could, in the political process and by always preferring political means to military ones. However, the election of their true representatives has mostly been invalidated and their political parties were declared illegal, not to mention the fate experienced by some of their leaders on the path of peaceful settlement, something that Carol Prunhuber describes very well in her book.

While from the Kurdish point of view, the recognition of nationalities in Iran, their equal participation in the decision-making process and decentralization of power are the best guarantee for a lasting democracy in this country, these legitimate requests are still perceived by Iran's political elites (not only in power but also in large parts of the so-called democratic opposition) as a threat to national cohesion. A national cohesion that has been in the making for more than eightie years by always following the same Jacobin pattern clumsily copied and imported from abroad. It consist of building a nation state in which political institutions reflect a dominant culture. Instead of relying on the historical realities of Iranian society and the Iranians peoples' will to live together, this enterprise has always depended on an iron fist. Hence its failure. Today, the conservatives' hold on the political process in Iran and the impossibility of reforming the Islamic Republic has made life unbearable for Iranian Kurds, the oppression being intensified under the presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (the same man who supposedly has been part of the team responsible for the assassination of Ghassemlou). The prohibition of Kurdish language in the public sphere continues. Despite the existence of natural resources in the Kurdish region in Iran, the area is deliberately left in a state of underdevelopment. The tense security climate is always tangible in Iranian Kurdistan, the only region in Iran heavily militarized where political executions continue to take place (For example, four of the five activists hanged two weeks ago in Evin prison in Tehran were Kurds). Not a day passes by without villagers living in frontier areas being shot or activists being arrested. Currently, more than a dozen Kurdish prisoners are sentenced to death and dozens of others serving, often under torture, lengthy prison sentences. In the past, we used to say that the central government imposed on us the violent method. For a few years and especially since the post-election protests, the Kurds, like the rest of liberty-loving Iranian people, have been trying by all means to impose on the regime the non-violent method. And yet the response of the Islamic Republic is still about fire and blood: imagine, Farzad Kamangar, who has just been hanged was a primary school teacher.

Let me finish by making a brief note about the international context of our struggle. Because of the policy of silencing and denial of the regime and because of an unfavorable international context (especially since the end of the Iran-Iraq war), the Kurdish conflict in Iran is currently quite neglected in the international fora. Furthermore, the lack of unity and firmness of the international community towards the Islamic Republic is also a factor in the continued suffering of the Iranians. Not only the ideal of human rights, but also long-term European interests require the adoption of a much more courageous policy towards a regime that turned Iran into a prison for its own people and a hot-bed for spreading violence in the world. In saying this, I'm not calling for an armed intervention. Between military intervention and the status quo, which is as dangerous to Iranians as to Westerners, there is a third way worth exploring: that is to completely isolate the Islamic Republic and to assist concretely the democratic forces in Iran.

This redefinition of the international community's attitude towards Iran can only be productive in the long term if at the same time the multi-national and multi-ethnic reality of the Iranian society are fully taken into account. Genuine democratic institutions must reflect the structural forces that make up the society. In Iranian society, the most important structural forces are the nationalities of this country. The best way to end a century of comings and goings of democracy and highjacking of power in Iran is to make these structural forces the very basic pillars of the future Iranian democratic design, a design in line with its own people and in harmony with the international community.

Thank you.

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14 July 2014

Message from the Secretary General of the Socialist International to the meeting at the House of Commons in London marking the 25th anniversary of the assassination of Kurdish leader Dr. A.R. Ghassemlou

Dear friends,

Yesterday, July 13, marked the 25th anniversary of the assassination in Vienna of Dr Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou, the Secretary General of the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan, along with his comrade, Abdullah Ghaderi Azar and Iraqi professor Fadhil Rassoul.

Three weeks before, Dr Ghassemlou had headed the PDKI's delegation to the 18th Congress of the Socialist International, which brought together leaders and representatives of social democratic, socialist and labour parties from different parts of the world, held in Stockholm. His vision, commitment and dedication to the cause of the Kurdish people, and indeed for democracy and human rights in Iran, was well known to our progressive movement. He was a man highly respected, who through his efforts and courage made the struggle of the Kurdish people for rights and freedoms a common cause with that of the quest for democracy and for the rights and the freedoms of all people.

Many of those who during that time were living the democratic revolutions which ushered in a new era for the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe; or those living the struggles for democracy in other parts of the world, like in Latin America, Africa, and in Asia, came into contact and got to know better the reality, hopes and aspirations of the Kurdish people in their various countries through the efforts of leaders such as Dr Ghassemlou, and others such as his successor as Secretary General of the Party, Dr Sharafkandi, later also tragically assassinated, on 17 September 1992, following his participation at the 19th Congress of the Socialist International in Berlin.

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We in the Socialist International know well from our own experiences and struggles around the world, that it would not be possible to build a society of rights for all people if there is no recognition of all the diverse groups within society, with guarantees of equal rights for all citizens. We know from our experiences that the common way forward for democracy to flourish and for peace to be achieved is the respect of all freedoms for all groups. Without guarantees of equal rights for all, space is created for sectarian divisions and extremism to grow. As we can see today, in many conflicts that affect countries in different parts of the world, it is always innocent people who suffer the results of these divisions. That is why in our International, parties such as the KDP have their place, as we recognise that the Kurdish people have to be granted their rightful voice in the decisions which affect the future of their country.

That is why we stand alongside the Kurdish people and all the democrats who are today seeking a future of peace and freedom in Iran. For the same reason, we have firmly rejected the creation of an Islamic caliphate in Iraq and called for a government of national unity with guarantees of pluralism based on equal rights for all citizens, including of course the Kurdish people. With those same principles and values in mind, we are standing today alongside the Kurds, as indeed all groups who are suffering in Syria, mobilised in the struggle for freedom and democracy.

Solidarity is an expression of our identity and has always guided our proposals and policies. It directs us in our fight for equality and in our struggles against all forms of discrimination and oppression.

For the members of the Socialist International, Dr Ghassemlou's legacy is a key component on the road to advancing today's efforts to strengthen and consolidate the voice of the Kurdish people in his native country, as everywhere. The work that he set out to do is not yet accomplished and our International will continue to denounce all forms of repression against the Kurds and to support multilateral efforts to advance and protect, in accordance with international law, the rights, security and improvement of the living conditions of the Kurdish people – all of which Dr Ghassemlou represented and represents today.

Luis Ayala Secretary General



On July 13th, it's 30 years since Dr. Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou, the most famous leader of Eastern Kurdistan and the general secretary of KDP was assassinated. After participating in Socialist International's congress in Sweden, DR. Ghassemlou travelled to Vienna in order to negotiate with Iranian government's "representatives" in order to find a peaceful solution to the Kurdish question in Iran.

We won't forget you neither forgive them.

Based on the idea that Kurds basically do not want war and the belief that there is no military solution to the Kurdish question and considering the fact that the eight-year war between Iran and Iraq had recently ended and the time for peace and reconstruction in Iran had come, Dr. Ghassemlou was searching for peaceful resolution of Kurdish question and to end the war in Kurdistan.

That is why he went to negotiate with the so called Iranian diplomats without considering the security arrangements. Instead of using the opportunity to put an end in foreign and domestic wars and give the Iranian people the genuine peace they deserved, the other party, the Iranian authorities followed their previous path of deception and assassination and plotted to murder Dr. Ghassemlou and his comrades.

The Vienna assassination was not the Iranian regimes the first act of state sponsored terror and they have not stopped the policy of annihilation of dissidents. From the beginning of the theocratic regime in Iran until now, more than 60 thousand Kurds in Eastern Kurdistan have been killed.

More than 300 Iranian Kurdish political activists in South Kurdistan in violation of sovereignty of a neighbouring country have been assassinated by Iranian terrorists. A dozen has been abducted without any trace of their whereabouts. Many European and Asian countries have become the scene of the Iranian assassins to eradicate the dissidents and this is not a strange thing to many of you. On the other side, the Kurdish struggle in Kurdish land which is divided between four countries has been going on for more than a century and despite all the efforts to crush it, it's now known all over the world. Many of you who knew Dr. Ghassemlou are aware of his thought and convictions appreciate that his philosophy could help resolving many of today's conflicts in the Middle East.

The question we Kurds never stop asking is how come the Austrian authorities for the sake of some trade interests with the theocratic dictatorship ignored all principles of rule of law, are officially allowed the terrorists of the Vienna assassination to return to Tehran?

How come the European countries which are the defendants of democracy in the world and they claim to be defendant the human rights, did not protest against this barbaric assassination? The Kurds will never forgive the Austrian government's unlawful handling of the Vienna assassination.

Eastern Kurdistan is a vast area with almost 12 million people with considerable natural resources and one of the richest parts of Iran. If this people could govern themselves and use the region's resources for their prosperity, not only they will have live a decent and good life, they also could create a good and secure place for foreign investment. But despite all these natural wealth people are living a harsh life and many of them have to commute the border areas and use primitive transportation tools like horses and mules and even their body to transport goods between South and East Kurdistan. Despite the hardship, the Iranian revolutionary guards attack these goods transporters and kill them indiscriminately. Is it justified in 21th century to get killed just to try to make a living? This is more painful considering the fact that the whole world is watching in silence.

We all know that the Islamic Republic of Iran has become a centre of terrorism and destabilization which its clergy dictators' dream of creating a theocratic Shia empire, has destabilized the whole region and their illicit activities will not stop until the international community forces them to abandon their imperialistic dreams. Where ever the Islamic terrorists lay their hands, death and abuse of human rights is spread and today the Kurds in all four countries have become a shield against terror and terrorism and the reactionary forces. They are the spearhead in the war against dark forces and they are sacrificing themselves in this struggle. Therefore, it would be unjust if all these struggle and sacrifices which is for the sake of the entire region and its people and even people elsewhere is not acknowledged and is forgotten.

Everyone knows that the Kurds are the largest people in the world without a nation and that a large portion of them are still persecuted and denied their basic human rights. It is not only a just cause but in the interest all parties to pay more attention to the Kurds and support their struggle.

On 30th anniversary of the assassination of Dr. Ghassemlou and his comrades, we remember their sacrifice and honour their memory.

I urge everyone to support (more than before), our human and national struggle. Mouloud Swara

London 13 July 2010

London 13 July 2019



13 July 20019

30 years on In memory of Abdul Rahman Ghasemlou Never to be forgotten

On this day in 1989, we were all shocked and deeply saddened by the news that our friend and comrade Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou, Secretary General of the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan, had been brutally assassinated along with his aide, Abdullah Ghaderi Azar.

To this day, no one has ever been brought to justice for these heinous murders.

We in the Socialist International built a strong relationship with him and we were together in the XVIII Congress of our International only three weeks before he was cowardly assassinated.

We will never forget him or his dedication to the cause to which he gave his life, and we will never give up our struggle to achieve full respect for the rights and freedoms of the Kurdish people. We have stood, and will continue to stand, firmly alongside our Kurdish comrades, in their quest for peace, democracy and equal rights.

On this 30th anniversary of his assassination, we pay homage and honour the legacy of Abdul Rahman Ghasemlou. We also pause to remember all the other martyrs who have equally fallen victim and paid with their lives for their commitment and belief in justice and equality.

His life and death was not in vain. His legacy lives on and will continue to be a source of inspiration for us all.

Luis Ayala Secretary General

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